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ABSTRACT
I argue for a naturalized conception of the faculty of intuition with particular
interest in intuition's role in moral contexts. I examine intuition in philosophical
discourse: namely, the Classic Intuitionists G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A.
Prichard. I bring to light relevant distinctions among their conceptions of intuition.
The explanation of an intuitive faculty in their philosophy has come to stand for the
paradigm of intuition in moral philosophy. In the section following, I will present the
objections that call into question intuition. I draw from Robert Audi and Laurence
BonJour since their respective projects attempt to deal with these same objections in
an attempt to formulate respective Moderate Intuitionist positions. I show how these
objections raised against intuitionism are objections to the epistemological role of
intuition. After, examining the objections, I present Mediocre Intuitionism and
Moderate Intuitionism both of which attempt to rearticulate the use of intuition in
moral thinking in ways that are less objectionable. I argue that all these conceptions
of intuition are moot, inadequate or incomplete. Finally, I examine research in
cognitive science related to intuition and its bearing on the development a complete
and adequate conception of intuition. Empirical study of cognition illuminates how
conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves as an intuition.
Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture of intuition can be derived from various
empirical studies. Cognitive science will be able to tell us something about the
immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the selfevidence of intuition. In particular, the results from empirical studies of intuition
affect Moderate Intuitionists' reformulation of intuition. These analyses point to a
naturalized conception of intuition.
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Introduction
The following is an analysis of a fundamental cognition in moral
epistemology: intuition. I venture to say that all interesting arguments in philosophy
turn significantly on intuitions. Consider arguments over Justice, Euthanasia, and
Abortion: Various positions in these debates are marked out by differing intuitions.
Yet, to a large extent, intuition is still unexamined. I take as part of my thesis that
intuition is a cognitive aspect of humans that can be studied by empirical science. I
set out to unearth what intuition is by elucidating how it is used in philosophical
discourse and by its study in cognitive science. Then, I draw these to concepts
together to create a more coherent view of what it is that moral philosophy turns on:
intuition.
I articulate Classic and Moderate Intuitionists' conceptions of intuition,
articulate arguments against these positions, and evaluate their legitimacy.
Ultimately, I argue for a conception of intuition that draw from philosophical
literature and conclusions drawn by cognitive science. 1 Perhaps, the resulting
naturalized conception of intuition is a necessary product of the methodology I have
taken. I am willing to bite the bullet on this point. The very aim of this project is to
advance a naturalized conception of intuition that is philosophically rigorous and
consistent with cognitive science's study of the faculties of the human mind.

1

For those crying ‘foul’ since they already familiar with the fact that most intuitionist are nonnaturalist, let me preface the rest of this project with the following claim. Intuitionism’s nonnaturalism has to do with the fact that moral facts are either non-natural properties or that intuited
propositions contain (implicitly or explicitly) non-natural terms, e.g. ‘goodness’. I take no position on
whether moral facts are non-natural. My aim here is not to naturalize the non-natural moral facts or to
reduce non-natural moral terms to natural terms. Instead, I aim to offer a naturalized account of the
apprehension of them by what we sometimes call ‘intuition’.

1

Empirical study of cognition illuminates how conscious and unconscious processes
manifest themselves as an intuitive belief. Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture
of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies. Cognitive science will be
able to tell us some things about intuitive knowledge - about the immediacy of
intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the self-evidence of
intuition.
Intuition in Philosophy
Rationalists use intuition as explanation for the means of arriving at the
justification of a priori propositions. Empiricists claim not to use intuition; however,
in practice their moral arguments rely to some degree on intuitions. Robert Audi
writes, "[Intuition] is certainly conceived divergently among ethical theorists, and
those who find its central elements compelling may often think it easiest and better
simply to argue for their position under another name than to indicate what kind of
intuitionism that hold and defend their position under that rubric." 2 Thus, few moral
philosophers claim to be intuitionists.
While the use of intuition in philosophy is prevalent, there seem to be very
few intuitionists. Intuitionism fell out of favor around the time A.J. Ayer, an
emotivist, published Language, Truth and Logic in 1936. Since then, calling a
philosopher an intuitionist has been sometimes tantamount to calling them something
that is less than a rigorous philosopher.

2

Robert Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics,” in Moral Knowledge?: New
Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (New York and
Orford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 101.
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Intuitionism has taken a bad rap, unjustifiably burdened with objections that
simply do not concern what the more plausible forms of intuitionism actually hold.
Some objections concern the metaphysical views the intuitionists are reported as
holding. For example, J.L. Mackie argues that intuitionism necessarily entails the
existence of implausible "queer entities" such as mind-independent moral properties
that would necessarily be intrinsically action-guiding, motivating, and supervene on
non-moral facts: something like Platonic forms.
Epistemological projects involving intuition have burdens as well. Thus,
moral philosophers have called into question intuition's epistemological grounding.
Some argue intuited beliefs are unjustifiable and/or held dogmatically. Those
involved in moral debates are sometimes reluctant to accept intuitions as rational
justification.
Despite the burdens of objections, many philosophers use intuition, albeit
under some other guise. Consider two examples: casuistry and principlism.
Casuistry is case reasoning. One decides what to do in any particular case by
comparing that case to straightforward, easily adjudicated paradigm cases. The
paradigm case one's case most closely resembles illustrates the possible right courses
of action to take. The distinction among characteristics of a particular case and
various paradigm cases can be quite fine. In particular, qualitative and quantitative
differences do not submit to straightforward criteria for adjudicating. In situations
where one's case is very similar to more than one paradigm case, the determination of
which paradigm case one should follow seems greatly reliant on intuition.

3

Principlism is similar in structure. However, instead of comparing our cases
to paradigm cases which show us what to do in a particular case, we apply principles
to our cases. Applied medical ethics uses the principles of autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence, and justice when deciding what to do in cases. Intuition is used to
decide which principle(s) applies or how to balance competing principles. We may,
alternatively, offer an argument to justify our decision for action.
In ordinary moral discourse, intuition is often used as a sort of justification for
one's argument or beliefs. Consider the following claims that seem to invoke
intuition as justification:
"I just see things that way."
"I suppose we have different intuitions and will just have to agree to
disagree."
"My gut tells me it's wrong/right."
"It's obviously wrong/right."
"It's just wrong to have sex with a chicken." 3
There are plethora of similar claims that invoke one's intuition as
reason for one's adhering to a particular position. Moral debates often turn on
grounds of intuitions.
I distinguish, generally, the use of intuition in philosophical discourse into
categories: Classic, Mediocre and Moderate Intuitionism. Classic Intuitionism
encompasses those philosophers who argue for some form of moral realism and that
we have a faculty of intuition by which we apprehend mind-independent moral facts.
3

See Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helen Koller, and Maria G. Diaz, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 65, No., 4 (1993), 613628. They examine the reaction of Brazilians and Americans to a variety of harmless situations. One
of the situations they describe to respondents is the use of a chicken carcass for masturbation.
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Mediocre Intuitionists use intuition in making judgments, but do not make claims to
Classic Intuitionist metaphysics: e.g., John Rawls. Moderate Intuitionists attempt to
reify the epistemological ends of Classic Intuitionists but do not claim that we
indefeasibly grasp mind-independent moral facts or that intuitions are infallible.
The significance of these observations is twofold: the faculty of intuition can
be distinguished from the moral theory of intuitionism; and a faculty of intuition is
often invoked, but neither well examined nor well understood.
Preliminary Conception of Intuition
Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., articulates what he takes to
be intuitionists' general position: "Writers who maintain that we have `intuitive
knowledge' of the rightness of actions usually mean that this rightness is ascertained
by simply 'looking at' the actions themselves, without considering their ulterior
consequences." 4 Distinguishing three phases of intuitionism, Sidgwick points out
that there are Perceptual, Dogmatic, and Philosophical Intuitionism. For Perceptual
Intuitionism, the rightness of some particular action is immediately known (intuitions
are directly grounded, similar to perceptions). For Dogmatic Intuitionism, the general
rules of Common Sense are accepted and applied axiomatically. And, for
Philosophical Intuitionism, the general dictates of Common Sense are accepted but
there are still attempts to find a deeper explanation for these current rules. 5 Later
forms of ethical intuitionism reflect Sidgwick's phases of ethical intuitionism in that
they usually entail three claims:
4

Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company:
1981), 96.
5
Ibid., 98 – 104. For a brief history of intuitionism’s development, see Sidgwick’s footnote on page
103 of The Methods of Ethics 7th ed.
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1.) There are many basic fundamental moral principles; these have independent grounds.
2.) The basic fundamental moral principles indicate the structure of a mind-independent moral
reality. (We might consider it to be ontologically distinct.)
3.) Some people can have direct (epistemic) access to the mind-independent moral reality.

The third of these claims can be evaluated independently. Importantly, I
distinguish the epistemological conception of intuition from the metaphysical
commitments of moral realism. Hence, I remain neutral in regard to the ontology of
the moral universe and the existence of mind-independent moral facts. Since
intuitionism is commonly linked to moral realism, I begin my analysis of intuition
with the Intuitionists. I, however, remain neutral about the realism/antirealism
debate. I will assume that some form of cognitivism is true. However, I do not
commit myself to any particular version. My emphasis is on the epistemological
analysis of ethical intuitions. 6
Epistemological Components of Intuitive Knowledge
A faculty of intuition can give us intuitive knowledge. The following is the
epistemological definition of intuitive knowledge.
One has intuitive knowledge that p when
1.) one's knowledge that p is immediate;
2.) one's knowledge that p is self-evident;
3.) one's knowledge that p is non-inferential; and
4.) one's knowledge that p is not an instance of the operation of any of
the five senses.
6

One might object that a characterization of intuition necessarily entails the metaphysical
commitments of moral realism or other metaethical views (e.g., cognitivism). However, we can
understand and make arguments about the way that we think when we intuit. We can study cognitions
without having a firm account of what it is that we are cognizing. For instance, we don’t need an
account of protons and electrons to study the way that scientists comprehend, understand and think
about them. Likewise, we don’t need an account of mind-independent moral facts to study how it is
that we cogitate about them.

6

Robert Audi articulates a basic kind of self-evident proposition p, "p is selfevident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for being justified in
believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding." 7
Immediate apprehension of a proposition is direct. Or, as H.A. Prichard puts it, "if
there is to be such a thing as knowing that we know something, that knowing can be
attained only directly, we in knowing the thing know directly, either at the same time
or on reflection, that we are knowing it." 8 Knowledge that is non-inferential is not
inferred from other beliefs. I will make more of these characteristics of intuitive
knowledge below.
Laurence BonJour offers a general account of the concept of intuition that is
helpful for understanding what intuition entails. BonJour writes that intuition is
the intellectual act in which the necessity of such a proposition is seen or grasped or
apprehended as an act of rational insight or rational intuition (or, sometimes, a priori insight
or intuition), where these phrases are mainly a way of stressing that such an act is seemingly
(a) direct or immediate, non-discursive, and yet also (b) intellectual or reason-governed,
anything but arbitrary or brute in character. 9

I approach intuition as a cognitive faculty, which performs the ‘act’ that
BonJour calls rational insight. However, I do not claim that intuition must be a
faculty completely distinct from other cognitive faculties, though it may have some
similarities. G.E. Moore draws an analogy between the faculty of intuition and the

7

Robert Audi, “Self-evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999), 206. Audi also articulates
another formulation, “I construe the basic kind of self-evident proposition as (roughly) a truth such that
any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (1) in virtue of having that understanding, one
is justified in believing the proposition (i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact
believes it or not); and (2) if one believes the proposition on the basis of that understanding of it, then
one knows it” (206).
8
H.A Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 94.
9
Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a priori Justification
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 102.

7

faculty of perception. This analogy is helpful insofar as it advances Moore's position.
We should not understand it as paradigmatic of all accounts of intuition.
Approaching intuition as a cognitive faculty does not commit one to admitting it is
analogous to the faculty of perception nor that it is necessarily an independent faculty.
To be clear, I'm using the term 'intuition' to denote the cognitive activity that
we commonly call "intuition." However, it is yet unclear if all instances that we term
'intuitions' are the upshot of the same cognitive activities. I use ‘intuition’ to refer to
a particular cognitive activities that apparently produce intuitive knowledge.
Intuitionist Epistemology: Structure of Justification
If moral propositions express moral beliefs, then how those beliefs are
justified matters morally. Foundationalist theories hold that for any belief x, x is
justified if and only if x ultimately follows from some belief that is justified but not
inferred from any other belief. 10 Intuitionism attempts to foundationally justify moral
beliefs. Intuitionism's moral epistemology is an attempt to provide answers to
foundationalist problems, e.g. how it is that we come to have foundational beliefs.
Intuited fundamental moral propositions are foundational in the structure of justifying
moral beliefs.
Moral realists seek foundational justification for moral beliefs since
foundational justification is consistent with how we experience that, for example,

10

Audi is instructive here, “the idea is that if one has any knowledge or justified belief, then first, one
has at least some knowledge or justified belief that is foundational, in sense that it is not (inferentially)
based on any further knowledge or belief and, second, any other knowledge or justified belief one has
in some way rests on one or more of these foundational elements.” Robert Audi, The Architecture of
Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2001), 3.
Foundationalism is often contrasted with coherentism. Coherentist theories hold that each justified
belief x is inferred (whether deductively, inductively, abductively, etc.) from some other belief y.

8

recreational baby torture is wrong. One just 'sees' that it is morally wrong. Laurence
BonJour says that these sorts of intuitions add credence to the plausibility of
foundational justification. He writes, "it certainly seems as though we have many
beliefs that are justified, not via inference from other beliefs, but rather by sensory or
introspective experience (and also a priori insight)." 11
Characteristics of intuitions are that they are self-evident and non-inferential.
Thus, intuitions are reflective of the sorts of beliefs that are foundational in the
structure of justification. Coherentism does not capture the structure of justification
that is consistent with common phenomena of moral experience. We do not see it as
a possibility that recreational baby torture could be acceptable, which might be the
case under the coherence structures of justification since recreational baby torture
would be morally acceptable if it coheres with other beliefs.
Foundationalist grounding of moral belief gives realist arguments for morality
a strong epistemic weight since our experience of 'wrong' is that 'it just seems wrong',
which is reflective of a foundational justification for our belief that it actually is
wrong. 12
Audi and BonJour work to maintain intuitionism in a more moderate form
than that of the Classic Intuitionists. Much of their effort is devoted to maintaining
the foundational character of intuitions. They constitute 'non-inferential' very broadly

11

BonJour, 197.
Audi speaks of epistemic weight. He states, “evidential grounds retain epistemic weight even when
overbalanced by counter-evidence and even when undermining evidence shows that they do not carry
enough weight in the circumstances to sustain (overall) justification.” Robert Audi, The Good in the
Right: A theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2004), 21.
12

9

in order to maintain that intuitive knowledge can be self-evident and thus
foundational in its justification. I make more of this issue in following sections.
Intuition and Cognitive Science
It seems obvious that intuition is a normal aspect of human cognition, not
unlike how the rest of the mind works. Approaching intuition as a cognitive faculty
invites an empirically oriented approach to intuition. Empirical study of the mind has
potential to illuminate how conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves
as intuition. Karl Popper, however, argues of creative intuitions that, "There is no
such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this
process. My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an
irrational element,' or 'a creative intuition'." 13 The empirical work that I present later
in this project will contradict Popper's 1968 assumptions that there is not a logical
reconstruction of the intuitive process.
A recent development in the discipline of philosophy has been an emphasis on
'Experimental Philosophy'. Shawn Nichols is part of this movement. He writes
Researchers at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science have begun systematic
exploration of folk concepts like wrong, knows, and refers. There is nothing novel in wanting
to characterize these concepts - that has been a preoccupation of philosophers for millennia.
The novelty of the recent work lies in the appropriation of social scientific methodology to
investigate what has heretofore been a largely a priori enterprise. This work also has
potentially wide ramifications for cognitive science since it's plausible that these concepts that
have attracted philosophical attention also guide cognition in central domains like moral
evaluation, mental state attribution, and semantic judgment. 14

13

Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 32.
Shawn Nichols, “Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science,” Trends in
Cognitive Science Vol. 8, No. 11 (November 2004), 514.
14

10

Some philosophers might object that this sort of project belongs in the natural
sciences and not the work of moral philosophers. I beg to differ. Just as it is
necessary in ethics to be clear about the facts of the case, it is just as (if not more)
important to be clear on the facts of how we arrive at judgments about that case.
Moral thinking is a cognitive activity. Cognitive activities are subject to empirical
examination in ways they formerly have not been. Philosophers would be naive to
ignore such examinations.
Shawn Nichols and William Casebeer have produced projects that makes
cognitive science relevant to moral philosophy. In Sentimental Rules, Nichols uses
cognitive science to argue for a Humean account of emotivism. 15 Casebeer, in
Natural Ethical Facts, uses a broad range of sciences, including cognitive science and
evolutionary biology, to give an account of moral reasoning. 16 Thus, I'm not alone in
thinking that science and moral philosophy are both important in answering questions
about moral reasoning. Moreover, a naturalized concept of intuition seems
plausible. 17 Michael Tye points out that

15

Shawn Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
16
William Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003).
17
I will make the general claim that a naturalized conception of intuition is one that can be informed
by the study of empirical science. I make no claims here to reductivism or physicalism, though I do
reserve the opportunity to take up those arguments. This relates to naturalizing intentionality or as
Thomas Bontly refers to it as ‘physicalizing intentionality’. He is interested in the possibility of giving
a physicalist/reductivist account of intentional relations, i.e. one’s relation to objects, properties, or
facts that are represented as cognitive content; also an interesting take on ‘naturalizing’. See Thomas
Bontly, ”Should Intentionality be Naturalized?”, n Naturalism, Evolution and Mind: Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplement 49: Proceedings of Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference held in
Edinburgh, Scotland 1999, ed. D. M. Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43 – 60.
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[T]he mental is studied by psychology. Psychology is a science no different in its procedures
and laws from other sciences. So of course, the mental is part of nature in ways […]
Naturalism with respect to the mental, once properly explicated, is really beyond question. 18

A caveat is necessary. Science itself is fallible - and for many different
reasons. Thus, what science can reveal for philosophers should not be taken lightly,
but, also, should not be accepted without scrutiny. Cognitive science uses human
behavior to study human cognition. By hypothesizing hypothetical constructs,
functions or mechanisms of the mind that are supposed to be responsible for the
behaviors being tested, cognitive scientists may not be testing the function of
cognition that is responsible for intuition. Researchers may merely test part of the
intuition's functioning. Also of concern is that experiments and studies in cognitive
science do not usually test realms of moral knowledge - if there are indeed
ontologically distinct moral realms. We may have a separate faculty of intuition that
relates only to what we might call 'moral objects'. However, if scientists study
behavior, then, as far as behavior is linked to cognition, scientists can say something
substantive about how the mind works in regard to making moral judgments.
Several studies and papers in cognitive science offer evidence concerning
intuition. Particularly interesting is what can be said of immediacy, self-evidence and
yield non-inferential knowledge ('non-inferentiality'). Moreover, it will be of interest
to examine how cognitive science will weigh in on objections to intuitionism.
As scientific theories about human cognitions change, so should philosophers'
thoughts about how we arrive at judgments. A healthy conversation between

18

Michael Tye, “Naturalism and the Mind,” Mind 101 (1992), 437.
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cognitive science and philosophy is due, and it is this conversation this project aims
at.
Outline of Thesis
I will begin by examining some of the history of intuition in philosophical
discourse: namely, the Classic Intuitionists G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A.
Prichard. 19 I bring to light relevant distinctions among their conceptions of intuition.
The explanation of an intuitive faculty in their philosophy has come to stand for the
paradigm of intuition in moral philosophy. Since my aim is to examine the concept
of intuition, I will pay relatively little attention to other, though substantive, areas of
their moral philosophies. This is, however, unfortunate since each has influenced the
development of moral thought. In the section following, I will present the objections
that call into question intuition. I draw from Audi and BonJour since their respective
projects attempt to deal with these same objections in an attempt to formulate
respective Moderate Intuitionist positions. I show how these objections raised against
intuitionism are objections to the epistemological role of intuition. After examining
the objections, I present Mediocre Intuitionism and Moderate Intuitionism, both of
which attempt to rearticulate the use of intuition in moral thinking in ways that are
less objectionable. 20 I argue that both these conceptions of intuition are either moot,
inadequate or incomplete. Finally, I examine research in cognitive science and its
bearing on developing a complete and adequate conception of intuition. In particular,
I look at how the results from empirical studies of intuition relate to criticisms and
19

There may be others in this group. But, I offer these as paradigmatic of the group.
In the following, I refer to ‘Moderate Rationalist,’ Laurence BonJour, and ‘Moderation Intuitionist,’
Robert Audi, as one group: Moderate Intuitionists.
20

13

objections to intuitive knowledge. These analyses point to a naturalized conception
of intuition.

14

Chapter 1
The Classic Intuitionists
Classic Intuitionists are G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, and W.D. Ross. They
attempted to show how moral knowledge can have foundational justification. Each
thought intuition was essential in identifying moral facts, arguing that morality is
woven into the structure of the universe and that we have a faculty of intuition that, in
some sense, could 'see' or apprehend moral facts. Moral facts, or moral properties,
are mind-independent. They exist independently of anyone's apprehension of them.
Thus, the Classic Intuitionists are moral realists. Moral realism is to be contrasted
with moral antirealism, which holds that there are no mind-independent moral facts.
There are a number of metaethical positions that are considered antirealist: e.g.,
Ayer's emotivism. 21
Moral realism is a difficult position to defend since moral facts seem to be, as
J.L. Mackie argues, metaphysically 'queer'. The Classic Intuitionist's epistemological
project, once divorced from its metaphysical entanglements, is salvageable.
Important to untangling intuitionism is to distinguish the epistemic from the
ontological commitments. In the following sections, I outline the view of Classic
Intuitionists and explain criticisms of their positions.
G.E. Moore
G.E. Moore, in Principia Ethica, presented arguments for metaethical claims:
namely about the subject matter of ethics, moral semantics, moral metaphysics and
21

Ayer’s emotivism served to undermine the intuitionists metaphysical position concerning the
existence of mind-independent moral facts. Ayer argued that moral claims were expressions of one’s
emotional disposition towards particular acts, more like expressions of opinions rather than statements
of about facts.

15

moral epistemology. 22 Moore thought that the notions of goodness and badness were
the most basic moral concepts; other moral terms such as rightness, wrongness and
virtue are definable by them. Moore's influence on the semantics of ethics is
recognizable even now. He famously made the "Open-Question Argument," arguing
that reductive accounts of the good that attempt to define 'good' by some other
normative or non-normative term would fail since 'good' is "simple," "unanalyzable"
and "non-natural." Moral properties conceived thusly avoid the pitfalls of what
Moore calls the "Naturalistic Fallacy." 23
Moore's metaphysics entailed a sort of moral realism. Roughly, Moore held
that there are moral properties that exist independently of the beliefs, concepts, and
dispositions of individuals or groups of individuals. Moore's non-naturalism rested
upon the claim that morality, e.g. 'goodness', could not be the subject matter of
empirical science. The naturalized conception of intuition that I argue for here and
Moore's non-naturalism do not conflict. Moore's claim was about the content of
moral discourse, i.e. that normative terms were ontologically different from nonnormative terms. I do not make claims to the contrary. My arguments concern the
way in which we apprehend those terms: Our thinking, understanding and
apprehending of morality can be the subject of natural science.
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Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds.), “Introduction,” in Metaethics after Moore (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 1.
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When we attempt to identify normative terms like ‘good’ with natural kind terms like pleasure,
Moore argues that we commit the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy” since saying, e.g. ‘x is pleasurable’ is not the
same thing to say ‘x is good’. Moreover, such claims are subject to the “Open-Question” Argument
since we can still ask ‘Is it good that pleasure is good?’ (“Is it good that it is good that pleasure is
good?” etc. etc.).
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Moore argued that moral properties are non-natural and simple. Good, qua
moral property, is simple since it is not composed of more basic parts. Moral
properties are non-natural properties since they cannot be the study of empirical
sciences. Intuition yields knowledge of simple, non-natural moral properties. That
good is simple and non-natural evidences the fact that it is also unanalyzable since
there is, in essence, nothing left to say of a simple property. Moreover, its nonnaturalness precludes it from empirical inspection. Despite being simple, non-natural
and unanalyzable, we still seem to have knowledge of moral properties.
For Moore, intuitive knowledge occurs 'in us' in much the same way that the
faculty of perception yields knowledge. We visually perceive yellow and hence
know 'yellow'. Likewise, Moore maintains that we have a faculty of intuition that in
some sense 'sees' good. Intuitive knowledge is foundational, and similar justification
is attributed to knowledge from visual perceptions. We do not infer 'yellow' from
other facts or properties. We see that something is 'yellow', which provides
foundational justification for our belief that it is yellow. Moral properties are grasped
by intuition in the same way: we just 'see', in an intuitional sense, that some act is,
e.g., 'good'.
Moore distinguishes two classes of intuited propositions, distinguished by
what makes them incapable of proof or disproof. 24 In regard to what makes an
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He says, “In order to express the fact that ethical propositions of my first class are incapable of proof
or disproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick’s usage in calling them ‘Intuitions.’ But I beg it may
be noticed that I am not an ‘Intuitionist,’ in the ordinary sense of term. […] The Intuitionist proper is
distinguished by maintaining that proposition of my second class propositions which assert that a
certain action is right or a duty – are incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of
such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not
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ethical proposition intuitively known, Moore stresses, "I mean merely to assert that
they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as the manner or origin of our
cognition of them." 25
W.D. Ross
Ross, probably the best-known intuitionist, attempts to systematize our
common sense ideas about duties. He articulates his Intuitionism in The Foundations
of Ethics and The Right and the Good. 26 He argues that our basic moral duties of
fidelity, reparation, gratitude, non-maleficence, and justice (i.e. promotion of the
good) are known to some persons of "sufficient mental maturity" by intuiting
fundamental moral propositions.
According to Ross, there is a "system of moral truth, as objective as all truth
must be." 27 Ross understood this system of moral truth to provide irreducible
plurality of moral grounds that support our duties. This was obvious to Ross since
there seems to be no one ground for one's self-evidently realized duties. 28
One comes to grasp the fundamental moral propositions expressing our duties
with experience and over time. Those propositions are self-evident. Ross writes in
The Right and the Good,

‘Intuitions,’ than to maintain that propositions of my first class are Intuitions.” G.E. Moore, Principia
Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), x.
25
Ibid.
26
W.D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics; the Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen,
1935-6 (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1939); and W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ed. Philip
Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002).
27
Ross, The Right and the Good, 15.
28
For example, I have a direct duty both to make those around me less miserable and to ensure that the
society is a just one. There are a number of direct duties that I may have of which none is superior to
others. Note, however, one could argue that even if duties have differential grounds, duties can be
systematized. B.C. Postow, “A Partial Application Procedure for Ross’s Ethical Theory,” Journal of
Philosophical Research, 31 (2006), 239-248.
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[General principles of duty] come to be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do.
We find by experience that this couple of matches and that couple make four matches, that
this couple of balls on a wire and that couple make four balls: and by reflection on these and
similar discoveries we come to see that it is of the nature of two and two to make four. In a
precisely similar way, we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the
fulfillment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another
promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we
apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment of a promise.

29

Ross argues that through experience one comes to recognize that particular
sorts of situations contain certain duties in the same way as in other situations we
recognize instantiations of mathematical axioms. Through intuition, we see that these
are our prima facie duties; these duties are self-evident. Thus, the apprehension of
mind-independent moral facts by intuition gives moral knowledge of the mindindependent system of moral reality.
Self-evident moral propositions apprehended by intuition require no other
justification for their truth than that they are apprehended and understood. However,
that does not entail that they are, as Moore claims, 'beyond proof.' One can offer
reasons for accepting that our prima facie duties are true without invoking intuition:
i.e., some things might be knowable both through intuition and in other ways, such as
by inference or argument.
The rightness or wrongness of a particular act is part of the mind-independent
moral order of the universe: there is some moral quality, character or property that is
apparent to us, that quality or character exists objectively, and has some normative
moral force. In the Foundations of Ethics and The Right and the Good, Ross argues
that we do not perceive rightness (or wrongness) directly. "Rightness is always a
29

Ross, The Right and the Good, 32-3.
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resultant attribute, an attribute that an act has because it has another attribute." 30
Rightness is always a part of the act considered in toto. It is contained in the act itself
and the effects to which it is causally connected (construed broadly). The rightness of
my saving a child's life is connected not only the act of saving the child, but that I
save the child and that child does not grow up to murder hundreds of people. For if it
was the case that I save a child and the child turns out to be a mass murder, my act
would be proportionally less right. 31 I, however, still have the duty to save the child,
but I also have the duty to prevent the suffering of all those that the child will kill.
Ross is an ethical pluralist. For him, there are several prima facie duties that
apply to any particular situation. 32 To choose which duty we follow is an attempt to
choose our actual duty. However, "Our judgments about our actual duty in concrete
situations have none of the certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general
principle of duty." 33 One's belief is justified when it is an expression of knowledge
that is either self-evident or a valid conclusion of self-evident premises. Beliefs about
the rightness of one's act do not have either of these criteria. Ross's Intuitionism does
not claim to be able to decide with any certainty what to do in hard cases. Ross bites
the bullet, accepting that we may judge wrongly about what duty we are supposed to
act on in a particular situation. This is a bit alarming; however, Ross notes, "we are
30

Ross, The Foundations of Ethics, 168.
The example I use may be exaggerating the relevance of the consequences to the rightness of the act.
However, that consequences are included as part of what makes acts right or wrong seems to be what
Ross is saying in The Foundations of Ethics. See pg. 183-191.
32
“Goodness is a resultant attribute; it belongs to anything to which it does belong, because of the
nature of the thing in some respect or other – because, for instance, it is a brave or not cowardly act.
And while even the vaguest apprehension of the goodness or badness of anything depends on some
previous insight into the nature of the thing, an apprehension of the degree of its goodness will depend
on close study of its nature, upon which the apprehension of the degree of its goodness supervenes, not
as a logical conclusion but as a psychological result” (Ibid., 184).
33
Ross, The Right and the Good, 30.
31
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more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the best of our ability on the prima facie
rightness or wrongness of various possible acts in virtue of the characteristics we
perceive them to have, than if we act without reflection. With this greater likelihood
we must be content." 34
H.A. Prichard
In "What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?", Prichard's concern is not only
how we come to have knowledge of moral principles but how those principles relate
to moral motivation. 35 It could be the case that one might have knowledge of moral
principles, know them self-evidently, but fail to act or to see that one should act on
them. Prichard points out, however, that this is not how we experience moral
obligations.
Prichard examines the following sorts of moral principles (for action):
"'Because I ought to stimulate any higher part of my nature,' or 'because I ought to do
any old friend a service which I alone can render' or 'because I ought to pay anything
I owe or have promised to pay'." 36 He finds that these principles admit of no other
reason for their being true than "that anyone must either recognize the truth of the
principle directly, i.e. as self-evident, or fail to see it altogether. This implies not only
that a further reason is not forthcoming but that it is not needed, the reason lying
within the principle itself." 37
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Ibid., 32.
H.A. Prichard, “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?” Moral Writings, ed. Jim Mac Adam
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002).
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Ibid, 4.
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Ibid.
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Prichard also holds that a principle's self-evidence is immediate: "[T]hat I
have promised to pay a man so much is the reason why I ought to pay it, i.e. the
connexion [sic] between the obligation to pay and my having promised is immediate,
i.e. that the one directly necessitates the other, as the straightness of a line necessitates
its being the shortest way between its ends." 38 Immediate apprehension directly
necessitating one's obligation, Prichard argues, is fundamental in moral deliberation.
That some other ground can be provided for our feeling of rightness is not necessary
to justify that moral principles are true. 39 Prichard writes:
We recognize, for instance, that this performance of a service to X, who has done us a
service, just in virtue of its being the performance of a service to one who has rendered a
service to the would-be agent, ought to be done by us. This apprehension is immediate, in
precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate, e.g., the apprehension
that this three-sided figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have three angles. Both
apprehensions are immediate in the sense that in both insights into the nature of the subject
directly leads us to recognize its possession of the predicate; and it is only stating this fact
from the other side to say that in both cases the fact apprehended is self-evident. 40

Prichard argues that there are two ways of apprehending: reflectively and
directly. Directly apprehending our moral obligations, which motivate agents to act,
is, on Prichard's account, an act of intuition. "The sense that we ought to do certain
things arises in our unreflective consciousness, being an activity of moral thinking
occasioned by the various situations in which we find ourselves." 41 Moral
38

Ibid.
In regard to justification of intuited principles Prichard writes:
If, e.g., we refer to the act of repaying X by a present merely as giving X a present, it appears,
and indeed is, necessary to give a reason. In other words, wherever a moral act is regarded in
this incomplete way the question “Why should I do it?” is perfectly legitimate. This fact
suggests, but suggests wrongly, that even if the nature of the act is completely stated, it is still
necessary to give a reason, or, in other words, to supply a proof. H.A. Prichard, “Does Moral
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 81 (January, 1912), 28.
40
Ibid., 28.
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obligations are apprehended directly, yet, when the demand to justify these
obligations is placed on the agent, he will be at a loss to offer the same proof to
others. The proof is that moral obligations are directly apprehended. One may,
however, by an act of reflective consciousness "realize the self-evidence of our
obligations, i.e., the immediacy of our apprehension of them." 42 One can show that
they are true only so far as we can show that they have the property of being selfevident. One cannot offer the same proof as when intuitions are derived from
unreflective consciousness.
Like Ross, Prichard is a pluralist. There is no single ground from which all
principles are deduced. A single ground would yield only one kind of duty. 43 It
seems obvious to Prichard that there are multiple kinds of duties or obligations that
we have, given our relative dispositions in regard to different individuals and various
circumstances.
Prichard argues that once one finds that one has a particular obligation by
virtue of one's relation to a situation, one then sees that this obligation can be held
elsewhere. "Hence we do not deduce the particular obligation from the principle
apprehended first. We first recognize the particular obligation and then by reflection
on it discover the principle, i.e. formulate to ourselves that general character of the act
which render, it, or any act like it, an obligation." 44
Prichard on conflicting obligations is pragmatic. He holds that when we do
have obligations that conflict, we should notice "(a) that obligations admit of degrees,
42

Ibid.
This point might be made better by contrasting a plurality of grounds for moral principles with the
singular ground that John Stuart Mill uses: the maximization of utility.
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(b) that in a case of conflict the question is simply 'Which obligation is the greater?',
(c) that in the end the question can only be answered by our immediate recognition,
when all the circumstances have been taken into account, that one is the greater or the
greatest, (d) that the problem is often one of extreme difficulty, but (e) that in any
case there is no general criterion for solving it." 45 Here too, similar to Ross, we see
that Prichard bites the bullet on how to decide difficult cases.
Summary of Classic Intuitionist Positions Regarding Intuition
The Classic Intuitionists argue that intuition yields intuitive knowledge.
Intuitive knowledge is, in some sense, self-evident, immediate, non-inferential, and
not derived from the five senses. 46 Each intuitionist may hold a slightly different
account of what these characteristics entail. I shall now point out these differences
and the related problem of 'understanding'.
Self-evidence
Moore argued that self-evident propositions are beyond proof or disproof, i.e.,
that no argument can be offered that would show their truth or falsity. Moore
distinguished reasons for propositions being true, "logical reason," from the reasons
for holding a proposition to be true. 47 A proposition whose truth is contained in
itself, not inferred from other propositions, is logically true, which is different from
45

Ibid.
The standard five senses play some sort of role in the apprehensions of intuition. Experience seems
necessary for anyone to understand what it is that they are intuiting. Experience plays the role
allowing agents to gain the background knowledge necessary for understanding the contents of intuited
propositions. Ross and Prichard seem to hold this view: Moore less so since experience and
background knowledge seems less relevant for agents intuiting self-evident propositions. Moore
grounds intuited propositions less in the epistemology of apprehended mind-independent moral facts
and more in the ontological properties he argues they must have: namely that they are simple, nonnatural and unanalyzable.
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holding that the proposition is true because it has these properties or because that one
has apprehended it as having these properties. 48 Prichard holds a similar
epistemological position. Prichard argues that principles admit of no other reason for
their truth than that one "must either recognize the truth of the principle directly, i.e.
as self-evident, or fail to see it altogether." 49 Prichard is consistent with Moore
concerning self-evident apprehension. Both hold that intuition is the only way to
recognize the self-evident truth of moral principles (as opposed to recognizing that a
proposition is true because it is self-evident). Contra Moore, Ross argues that some
other argument can be given concerning the truth of a proposition, even if the
proposition cannot be grasped intuitively. Ross must, however, admit that if
fundamental moral propositions are not grasped intuitively, even if the can be, one
will not have foundational grounds for believing those positions are true.
Immediacy
It is necessary to distinguish senses of immediacy since they are sometimes
confused, equivocated, or just overlooked. The epistemological sense of immediacy
has to do with the directness of apprehension: arriving at the truth of some
proposition is not the consequence of a process. The phenomenological sense of
immediacy is a change that occurs instantaneously or quickly, relating to temporality.
Our experience of having an intuition may be that the solution appears to us to be
48

Audi argues that Moore does not actually hold the position that self-evident propositions are beyond
proof since Moore thought there could be reasons for hold the proposition to be true apart from the
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provide justification for believing. These are the reasons that Audi refers to as “evidential reasons”
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immediate and direct in the phenomenological sense, yet the proposition may not in
fact be epistemologically direct. 50
As I understand Ross, he emphasizes that intuition occurs immediately,
sometimes only after a long period of coming to grasp the content or meaning of
propositions. The act of coming to understand the contents of a self-evident
proposition may take some time; however, the intuiting is itself epistemologically and
phenomenologically immediate. As I understand Moore and Prichard, they take
similar positions in regard to immediacy; however, they do not emphasize that one
may need to reflect on or think about a proposition to apprehend it. Self-evident
propositions are apprehended immediately, in both the epistemic and
phenomenological sense.
'Non-inferentiality'
Moore, Prichard and Ross agree that intuited knowledge is neither inferred
from the five senses nor from other beliefs. The understanding of intuited
propositions delivers (directly) the truth of the proposition, without inference. One
might have to obtain a certain quantity or set of experiences to understand the content
of the propositions. Nevertheless, the meaning of terms is not taken as derived or
inferred from the senses. Understanding a self-evident proposition in no way entails
the use of inference to arrive at the truth of the proposition. Moore makes this point
more apparent when drawing the analogy between perception and intuition. Intuitive
50

Some unconscious processing that is stepwise may be occurring ‘under the surface’, as I show later
when I present data from cognitive science. Thusly, epistemologically, there is no directness, but
phenomenologcially, we have the experience of directness. One may also hold a belief occurrently and
that belief be immediate, in the epistemological sense. A proposition may be immediately known, in
the epistemological sense, but not instantaneous since change from a non-belief state to holding a
dispositional belief may take a relatively long period of time, but not be the result of inference.
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knowledge is not derived from the senses, but, in a similar way, is apprehending by
'seeing'.
… the Remaining Problem
What is problematic for Ross and Prichard is the relationship between 'selfevidence' and 'understanding'. Fundamental moral propositions that are self-evident
are also non-inferential. However, that not everyone intuits these propositions supposedly since not everyone understands them in the relevant way - leads us to
question how and why we understand them in a particular way. 'Understanding', thus,
is particular to a (perhaps broad) set of experiences. Hence, apprehending particular
self-evident propositions is, in some sense, dependent on a set of experiences (as far
as that set of experiences is required for 'understanding') This leads me to wonder if
one must infer from those experiences to grasp the truth of the propositions. If such
an inference is indeed involved in the apprehension, then those propositions are no
longer self-evident. What intuitionism requires is an adequate understanding of
'understanding'. BonJour and Audi attempt to rectify this problem by construing
'understanding' and non-inferentiality more broadly. Their broad conception of
understanding allows that the meaning of propositions is entailed or contained within
the proposition itself. I will take this up below when I address the Moderate
Intuitionists and cognitive science.
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Chapter 2
Problems for Classic Intuitionism: The Epistemological Burdens of Intuition
The following are objections to intuition commonly attributed to Classic
Intuitionism. Any plausible intuitionism must deal with these objections. I am not
interested in the metaphysical project of substantiating the existence of mindindependent moral facts. Thus, the objections are geared to present the
epistemological burdens of an intuitive faculty. 51 I present them in short and then lay
them out more explicitly, where appropriate, as I present responses to the objections.
(1) The Dissensus Objection: Intuitions as far as they are self-evident are
implausible since if basic principles of ethics are self-evident, there would not
be so much disagreement over what they are. 52 Disagreement may come on
two counts: what one person holds as self-evident either (a) fails to seem selfevident to a second person; or (b) is in conflict with some proposition another
person sees as rationally self-evident. 53
(2) The 'Non-Discursive' Objection: Intuition is un-evaluable since it has no
steps or functions to evaluate for adequacy. 54
(3) The Dogmatic Objection: Intuition is "subjectively compelling" even
when it is the product of bias: emotional or intellectual. 55
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J.L Mackies ‘Argument from Queerness’ in a widely cited objection to Intuitionism. See J.L.
Mackie, “The Subjectivity of Values,” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). However, his objection concerns the metaphysics of mindindependent moral facts and our ability to know them. My concern here is the epistemology of the
faculty of intuition. As far as such a faculty is able to be the study of empirical science, I am able to
avoid his objection.
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Audi, The Good in the Right, 60.
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(4) The Meta-justification Problem: Intuitionists are unable to provide
meta-justification, "a second-order reason or justification for thinking that
accepting rational insight [intuition] or apparent self-evidence is at least likely
to lead to believing the truth." 56
(5) The Causal Objection: There is no causal relation between an intuited
belief that p and the object or situation to which p pertains. 57
(6) The External Criterion Problem: Establishing independent criteria for
intuition to provide reliable beliefs is "inherently futile." 58
BonJour and Audi do a decent job of responding to these objections.
Nevertheless, more can be said in reply to their positions when we elucidate the
cognitive functioning of intuitions. Thus, showing how an intuitive faculty functions
can offer something to be said for each of the above objections. In the following, I
offer replies to these objections and examine the Moderate Intuitionist positions of
Audi and BonJour, who attempt to reconcile Classic Intuitionism with its objectors.
Each of these objections in some way challenges the characteristics of intuitive
knowledge (self-evidence, immediacy, and 'non-inferentiality'): The Dissensus
Objection, Dogmatic Objection, and External Criterion Problem relate to issues
concerning self-evidence, while The 'Non-Discursive' Objection, Meta-justification
Problem and Causal Objection relate to the immediacy and that intuitive knowledge is
55

“What is to prevent any person who is emotionally biased or intellectually dogmatic from regarding
a claim that seems subjectively compelling to him as a product of such insight [intuition]?” (Ibid.).
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non-inferential. However, Audi and BonJour's replies are inadequate. After
explaining the Intuitionist responses to these objections, I, in the following sections,
turn to cognitive science in an attempt to buttress intuition against these inadequacies.
Replies to the Objections to Classic Intuitionism
The Dissensus Objection
Two instances of dissensus are problematic for self-evident intuitions: (1) a
proposition that is self-evident to one person fails to seem self-evident to a second
person; and (2) a self-evident proposition is in conflict with some proposition another
person sees as rationally self-evident. (2) is further divided: (a) there could be a
conflict over which self-evident moral principle should be followed since the ends
which they prescribe are mutually inconsistent; (b) there could be an apparent logical
contradiction between self-evident propositions.
We might describe (2a) cases in Ross's terminology: there is a conflict
between two individuals over which prima facie duty should be the actual duty. In
(2b) cases, the logical contradiction is such that one could not consistently hold that
both propositions are true at the same time: e.g., one could not consistently hold that
both A and ~A are true propositions.
Ross bites the bullet in (2a) set of dissensus cases. These are disagreements
about how one's prima facie duties should be acted upon. Since there are a plurality
of grounds for the prima facie duties, there is not a single principle or overarching
framework from which they are derived. Without a principle or framework to
adjudicate over what duty ought to be one's actual duty, there is room for practical
disagreement over what prima facie duty is one's actual duty in cases where more
30

than prima facie duty applies. These are practical disagreements over how Rossian
intuitionism ought to be applied. I have little interest in these issues for this project. 59
I am, however, interested in (2b) sets of cases. In these cases, agents disagree
over which of the contradictory self-evident propositions are self-evident. The
disagreement concerns the notion of self-evidence itself. BonJour argues that such
dissensus is resolvable through discourse over a shared set of premises or by
reflecting on actual cases. "Thus it is simply not true that the absence of relevant
shared premises must result in either stalemate or the employment of non-rational
means of persuasion." 60 By either becoming more clear on the meaning of the
contents of the proposition or considering the proposition more broadly, as situated in
context, both parties will come to some sort of agreement. Notice that the dialogue is
not over the nature of the self-evidence, but over some other set of premises that
would alternatively justify the proposition. How far this maintains their noninferential character is questionable. That self-evident intuitions are non-inferential
leads to another objection, The 'Non-Discursive' Objection.
Alternatively, we might chalk (1) and (2b) cases up as Ross does to the lack of
adequate understanding of the meaning of the contents of the proposition. Thus,
when the second agent comes to understand the proposition she will recognize the
truth entailed by its self-evidence. I think that this sort of reply makes light of the
objection.
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Audi, in The Good and the Right, argues that combining a Rossian Intuitionism and Kant’s
Categorical Imperative can systematize the basic fundament moral principle of Rossian Intuitionism.
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Audi draws our attention to a number of ways to understand self-evidence:
immediately self-evident vs. mediated self-evident; conclusions of inference vs.
conclusions of reflection; and rational intuitionism vs. empirical intuitionism.
Immediately self-evident propositions are those that are "readily understood by
normal adults (or by people of some relevant description, e.g. the mentally mature
Ross spoke of)." 61 Mediately self-evident propositions differ in that "their truth can
be grasped by such people only through the mediation of reflection." 62 Audi,
however, does not construe this sort of mediated reflection as offering inferential
justification. Rather, this sort of reflection reaches "the kind of understanding
required to see the truth of the proposition 'in itself'." 63 Mediately self-evident
proposition are not conclusions of inference: they are not "premised on propositions
noted as evidence." 64 They constitute a kind of conclusion of reflection: it comes
about after thinking about the object intuited as a whole. There are no premises upon
which the truth of the proposition is based. 65
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Audi, The Good and the Right, 51.
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The dissensus conceived thusly can occur in the following cases: (a) one
agent apprehends immediately the self-evident proposition and the other fails to
apprehend it immediately and mediately; (b) one agent apprehends immediately the
self-evident proposition and the other fails to apprehend immediately , but attempts a
mediate route to self-evidence, fails, and argues the failure is evidence that the
proposition is not indeed self-evident; and, (c) one agent apprehends the mediate selfevidence and the second agent fails to see that the proposition is self-evident at all that the proposition is only 'mediately self-evident' is reason for distrusting that it is
actually self-evident.
There does not seem to be a way to adjudicate what sort of self-evidence,
immediate or mediated, is appropriate for any particular proposition. Though, I think,
Audi would simply argue that all self-evident propositions are open to both ways of
apprehending. In this way, any immediately self-evident proposition can be
understood as mediately self-evident since entailed by their being self-evident is that
their truth is contained within the contents of the proposition itself. Thus,
understanding is a condition for self-evidence and that condition obtains in either case
of self-evidence: immediately or mediately.
I think Audi's answer is incomplete. It is obvious that mediately apprehended
intuitions entail some sort of mental process that leads one to intuitive
apprehension. 66 Audi's supposition that the resulting intuitive knowledge is a result
of mere "understanding," "reflection," and "thinking" lacks the explanatory power to
66

The same can be said for immediately apprehended self-evident propositions; though, it is not in the
same way obvious since if propositions are apprehended directly, there need not be reflective
understanding entailed by the apprehension of the proposition.
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describe what cognitions are occurring when a proposition is intuitively apprehended.
I present empirical evidence in the next chapters that, to a greater extent, explains
these cognitive processes.
The 'Non-Discursive' Objection
Intuitions have the character of being non-inferential, immediate, and direct.
Thus, the process by which one arrives at self-evidence cannot be evaluated in a
reflective way. I cannot turn back on my own or another's intuitive apprehension that
a proposition is true in order to analyze for adequacy the process by which one arrives
at truth. There are no premises, rules, or appeal to any sorts of criteria by which one
comes to have an intuition. There are no relations amongst premises or relations of
premises to conclusions that can be evaluated. Thus, intuitions are non-discursive.
Hence, many intuitionists are charged with being dogmatic since those who hold
intuitions cannot offer reasons for why their intuiting of a proposition is correct.
Not all instances of arriving at intuitive knowledge lack other reasons for the
correctness of one's intuitive apprehension. Audi construes intuition broadly as
encompassing not only the immediately self-evident, but also the mediately selfevident. There seems some room for justifying one's mediate intuition even if it has
the character of being non-discursive. If the intuition is immediate and direct, then
evaluation is not likely. If the evaluation is of the mediately self-evident proposition,
then one can evaluate how it is one came to understand the contents of the
proposition. One is still unable to evaluate the realization of the self-evident truth.
What is evaluated is the process of one's coming to realize. For example, I might
explain how I came to understand the proposition x, by virtue of that understanding I
34

arrive at the self-evidence of the proposition. I can explain to another how I arrived
at the understanding of x. However, I am still not able to explain how that
understanding gives to me x's self-evidence.
Also, if it can be shown that an intuition is not dogmatic or in some other way
biased, then we have more reason for believing that it is correct. However, cognitive
science's empirical examination of the cognitive processes will show whether the
cognition that we attribute non-discursive character to is actually direct and
immediate.
The Dogmatic Objection
What is to distinguish an 'intuition' resulting from dogmatic belief or personal
bias from an authentic intuition? BonJour notes of inauthentic intuitions that "despite
seeming clearly and obviously true, they will [almost always] not seem necessary in
the relevant sense," even to those having them. 67 Consider BonJour's example:
"while a mother's emotional bias may lead her to regard her own child better-behaved
than other children, she is extremely unlikely to regard this fact as metaphysically
necessary." 68 Presumably, sufficient self-reflection will reveal beliefs held on the
grounds of personal bias.
One solution is to establish a set of criteria for having intuitive beliefs that are
not biased or dogmatic. However, BonJour objects that any criteria would be
established via empirical methods and hence undermine the a priori character of
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Ibid., 135.
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authentic intuitions. 69 Applying criteria to intuitive apprehensions does not eliminate
the possibility of intuitive knowledge outright - just the fully a priori intuition the
rationalist pursues. 70
BonJour points out that we may not always identify biased or dogmatic
intuitions. However, we are aware of personal biases of individuals. It seems in
these cases we are normally wary of the intuitive knowledge that others offer when it
is consistent with their personal biases. We are wary of the Catholic's intuitions about
abortion and of Hitler's intuitions about 'the right direction for Germany'. Careful reexamination of intuitions via internal reflection and third party consensus will help
eliminate inauthentic intuitions. We may not capture all erroneous intuitions in this
manner, but given time and suitable reflection most will be weeded out. Moreover,
the possibility of authentic a priori intuition is still left open.
The Meta-justification Problem
The Meta-justification Problem argues that a "a second-order reason or
justification" is needed to make us think that self-evidence is "likely at least to lead to
believing the truth." Intuitions are immediate (direct), non-inferential and selfevident; thus they cannot offer other reason(s) for thinking they are true.
Audi distinguishes between first-order intuitions, understanding that a
proposition is true (non-inferentially); and, second-order intuitions, understanding
that a proposition is self-evident and as such is non-inferential and is true in itself.
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Thus a rationalist view of a priori justification plainly cannot appeal in this way to an independent
criterion in order to solve the present problem” (Ibid., 135-6.).
70
This poses another dilemma for this project, The External Criterion Problem, which I take up later.
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Intuition conceived thusly offers second-order justification for believing our intuition
that a proposition is true, i.e. because it is self-evident.
Audi seems to present meta-justification for intuited beliefs. However, a
better account of the processes involved in intuition would offer other second-order
reasons for thinking that the intuitive apprehension is correct. Cognitive science can
offer an account of processes involved in intuition. This more robust account will
serve as a better template for evaluating and offering justification that intuitions are
correct. Moreover, a criteria for meta-justification may also help eliminate those
intuitions that are the result of dogmatically held beliefs or bias.
The Causal Objection
Alexander Miller's argument that moral realists are "epistemologically
bankrupt" points out that moral facts are not causally related to the beliefs we purport
to have of them. 71 In other words, seeing (the fact) that burning a cat is wrong cannot
be epistemologically justified. 72 The sort of moral property the moral realist
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Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
2003), 35-6. Intuition is supposed to give us epistemic access to moral facts, which is supposed to
provide justification for our believing them. Intuition is the explanation for how intuited belief
manifest. Miller argues that intuition could be defended in two ways:
(A) We are justified in having beliefs about moral facts since intuition has the capacity for
making correct moral judgments; and
(B) We are justified in having beliefs about moral facts since intuition is a
cognitive faculty similar to sense-perception in some respects, but unlike sense-perception
insofar as the state of affairs perceived are not part of the causal order. (Miller, 35)
He argues that both possibilities fail. (A) fails because “’correct moral judgments access the moral
facts because they are the upshot of exercises of the capacity to form correct moral judgments’ is
trivial and completely unexplanatory” (Miller, 35) (B) fails because it does not tell us the relevant
aspects of intuition that make it similar to sense-perception, moreover, that those similarities are
relevant for our justifying beliefs in the same way that we justify beliefs derived of senseperception.(Miller, 35-6.) Note that beliefs derived of sense perception, on my account, are not
foundational since other beliefs are necessary to justifying them.
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Gilbert Harman uses the example of burning a cat in Nature and Morality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), 4.
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describes "is not part of the part of the causal order and is not detectable by the
senses." 73 Non-moral facts, on the other hand, have a causal story about how they
come to be represented as beliefs. Consider my dog Annabelle. I have a justified
belief that she is curled up in front of the fireplace. There is a causal story that
coheres with the beliefs I have of Annabelle, how that belief comes to be represented
in my mind; and, moreover, those beliefs cohere with (almost all) of the rest of my
beliefs: e.g. that I remember getting a dog, naming her "Annabelle," raising her, etc. 74
There are, however, no theories for perceiving moral facts that cohere well with other
beliefs about how I come to hold beliefs that are justified. There is not a causal story
for how intuitions are manifested as beliefs. They just seem to 'pop' into conscious
thought.
BonJour points to the same problem: there is no causal relation between my
belief that p and the object or situation to which p pertains. 75 If moral facts exist,
then, as far as a faculty of intuition is similar to a faculty of perception, we
presumably need a causal story of how mind-independent moral facts are causally
related to the beliefs one has of them. BonJour, however, points out that we ought to
not take the analogy of intuition and sense perception too seriously. It represents, to
an extent, the apprehension of self-evident truths. It does not, however,
If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it,
you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure
anything out; you can see that it is wrong.
73
Miller, 35.
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Cognitive science describes how I perceive, how those perceptions come to be represented in my
mind and that I hold beliefs about them. In general, there is a theory about light waves; how they
interact with physical objects (like Annabelle); and how they interact with the physiology of my eyes
(cornea, rods, cones, nerve fibers, etc.) to become representation in my mind, which I then can attribute
beliefs to. Note that these scientific theories about perception and belief formation are part of the
coherent structure of justification for my belief that Annabelle is actually in front of the fireplace.
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BonJour, 156.

38

straightforwardly represent the metaphysical relation of one's apprehensions and
those things that they are apprehending. This relationship is one that the current
project butts up against but does not address directly. The nature of the moral
universe will have to be left for elsewhere. 76
The External Criterion Problem
In In Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour articulates and attempts to defend a
traditional rationalist theory of a priori justification. BonJour argues that a priori
justification is attainable by rational insight, or what I have been calling "intuition."
BonJour argues that establishing independent criteria to prevent biased and dogmatic
intuition is "inherently futile" since such criteria will be empirically defined. 77 The
objection continues:
[N]either the justification of such a criterion nor its application to a particular case could
conceivably be a matter of direct observation, both would have to involve reasoning or nonobservational judgment and thus would have to appeal to non-discursive, a priori insights of
precisely the sort that raise the concern about bias and dogmatism in the first place. And, to
appeal to that same criterion to resolve these new worries would be both circular (as regards
its justification) and viciously regressive (as regards its application).
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I have already pointed out that there are ways of evaluating the adequacy of
intuition, which serve as a sort of verification, by offering other routes to justifying
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Walter Sinnott-Armstong criticizes Audi’s suggestion that standard sources of justification (i.e.
perception, introspection, memory and reflection) do not need to justify their “justificatory credentials”
(Audi, Architecture, 19). In ”Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture of Reason,”
Sinnott-Armstong asks Audi to provide reasons why we ought to accept the standard sources of
justification: “Is this just a prejudice in favor of the familiar or is there some rational basis for he
standards that Audi accepts along with the rest of us?” (187) Like Sinnott-Armstong, I’m wary of why
we ought to think that justification for moral beliefs can be adequately justified by perception in its
intuitive sense. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The
Architecture of Reason,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXVII, No. 1 (July 2003),
181-187.
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BonJour, 136.
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intuited knowledge - some other route via inference. For instance, we may simply
show that there are no reasons for thinking that the intuition is the result of dogmatic
or biased beliefs, or some other agent may give us reasons for believing a proposition
that they themselves arrived at intuitively, or we may internally reflect on the
intuitively apprehended belief to see if it coheres with their other beliefs (some of
which may also be intuitively derived). The intuition can be confirmed to some
degree. These sorts of justifications do not undermine the a priori character of
intuition. These observations do not constitute external criteria, but a means by
which one can (internally) correct one's intuitions. 79 By re-examining the selfevident proposition, one can continue to see it as self-evident. Or, see that the
propositions coheres well with other beliefs that one has.
There is a further worry that is spurred by The External Criteria Problem.
That is, empirical evaluation of intuitions cannot serve to justify them in a way that
confirms that they are a priori true. Such evidences can confirm or disconfirm, but
such confirmation or disconfirmation will have empirical or a posteriori character.
However, BonJour begs the question against empirical evaluations of a priori
knowledge, i.e. intuition. The phenomenon he calls rational insight, or intuition, has
properties that are not knowable via one's own phenomenological evaluation of
intuition, i.e. one's own experience of it does not grasp unconscious thinking that may
be operative in intuition. Empirical evidence suggests that the phenomenon that we
experience as intuition is neither non-discursive nor non-inferential. Thus, BonJour is
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If one is pressed into admitting that they are indeed external criteria, one should hold that they are
second-order criteria for accepting intuitive beliefs.
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wrong about his characterization of the intuitive faculty. Evidence from cognitive
science will show this.
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Chapter 3
Mediocre Intuitionism
It is important to note a range of philosophers who use intuitions in the course
of moral decision-making, but do not make any claims to the epistemic priority of
intuited beliefs over or above other beliefs. I term these sorts of philosophers
Mediocre Intuitionists. One of the most outstanding is John Rawls. 80 In both his
early and late writings, Rawls does not take intuition to offer any sort of ‘special’
knowledge.
John Rawls speaks of ‘moral insight’ in “Outline for a Decision Procedure for
Ethics.” 81 He writes,
[I]t is required that the judgment be intuitive with respect to ethical principles, that is, that it
should not be determined by a conscious application of principles so far as this may be
evidenced by introspection. […] An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough
inquiry into the facts of the case, and it may follow a series of reflections on the possible
effects of different decisions, and even the application of a common sense rule […] . What is
required is that the judgment not be determined by a systematic and conscious use of ethical
principles. 82

The sort of judgment Rawls articulates is, roughly, an intuitive one. I take this
to be the operation of a 'moral insight' by a normally intelligent persons who use
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R.M. Hare, in Moral Thinking, classifies John Rawls as an “intuitionist.” He writes,
True, few philosophers are prepared to own to the name ‘intuitionist’; but the majority use
arguments which would have no cogency unless intuitionist assumptions were made.
Professor Rawls (1971) is a good example. Having […] diverted the name ‘intuitionism’ into
a new meaning, in which it means something like ‘pluralism’, and signifies the belief that
there are moral principles which are logically independent of one another (a belief which
could be held by many besides intuitionists, and which intuitionists who are monists and
believe in a single all-sufficient moral principle could deny), Rawls then proceeds, although
disclaiming the name, to use appeals to intuition at all the crucial points in his arguments,
which he would not do unless he believed that this was a valid method of reasoning. R.M.
Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods, and Point (New York: Oxford University Press,
1981), 75.
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common sense reasoning of the soft logics of ordinary moral discourse. That is, they
do not require rigorous explanation of intuitions in the process of making moral
judgments. Moral judges use intuitions in making moral judgments because, overall,
they are productive in constructing a satisfactory moral theory (perhaps by the
process of wide reflective equilibrium). 83 Note: Rawls' metaphysical commitments in
regard to intuition differ between his early and late writings. Early Rawls is simply
neutral in regard to the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of an intuitive
capacity of moral agents. Later Rawls is opposed to moral intuitionism (and moral
facts) that would violate or preclude persons from being heteronymous. 84
Principlism and casuistry, which I articulated above, seem to fit the
description of the Mediocre Intuitionism as well. Neither makes metaphysical claims
to what intuitions entail, however, both theories require the use of intuition.
I set aside Mediocre Intuitionism since the sort of knowledge arrived at is not
intuitive knowledge: intuitions of this sort lack the epistemological underpinnings to
83

Alternatively, we might take Mediocre Intuitionists to defend a proper functioning theory like that
which Alvin Plantinga Defends:
… a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been produced in me by cognitive faculty that
are working properly (functioning as they ought to, subject to no cognitive disfunction) in a
cognitive environment that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties, (2) the segment
of the design plan governing the production of that belief is aimed at the production of true
beliefs, and (3) there is a high statistical probability that a belief produced under those
conditions will be true. From Richard Feldman, Epistemology, (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 2003), 100. Original in Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Functioning
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 59.
We may even construe more broadly that Rawls’ reflective equilibrium method is an intuitive
methodology. Brad Hooker writes in “Intuitions and Moral Theorizing” [in Ethical Intuitionism: Reevaluations, Ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 161.] that the reflective
equilibrium method can be characterized as an intuitionism. That is, the reflective equilibrium method
hold that “Moral Theories are better to the extent that they accord with moral claims that are attractive
in their own right – i.e. apart from any inferential support they receive from other moral claim.”
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See John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77, No. 9. (Sep.
9, 1980), 519; 526-7. Rawls, however, does not preclude that moral fact are ingredient in construing
the principles of justice. (519).
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substantiate that they are self-evident, non-inferential and immediate. I take it that
the Mediocre Intuitionists are just not concerned with rigorous epistemological
justification of intuitive knowledge, yet they use 'intuition', in a rough sense, in
making moral judgments. One might argue of particular Mediocre Intuitionists, e.g.
principlists, that intuitive knowledge is a necessary component in the justification of,
at least, some of their moral judgments. As such, a more rigorous explanation of
intuition is required of those Mediocre Intuitionists. Should this be the case, some of
the objections to Classical Intuitionism might concern Mediocre Intuitionism. Thus,
some Mediocre Intuitionists might be aided in by the conception of intuition that
comes out of cognitive science. 85
Moderate Intuitionists: Robert Audi and Laurence BonJour
Moderate Rationalism is an intuitionist position that emphasizes that intuitive
knowledge is not indefeasible and that a faculty of intuition is fallible. Laurence
BonJour and Robert Audi are Moderate Rationalists. Audi finds Ross's intuitionism
reasonable albeit flawed in some respects. Audi argues for a more plausible Rossian
sort of intuitionism in The Good and the Right. His purpose has two aims, "to
respond to the theoretical concerns of philosophical critics of intuitionism and to
develop an overall intuitionist position that represents a theoretical advance beyond
Ross's view but is at least as useful as his in approaching moral problems of everyday
life." 86
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I think the project of substantiating that a moral rigorous explanation of intuitive knowledge is
needed from each Mediocre intuitionist would be much too large to take on in this project. It will have
to left for elsewhere.
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The core distinction of Moderate Intuitionism is that one's intuitions about
moral propositions or mind-independent moral facts are not necessarily true or even
maximally justified by virtue of our intuiting them. In other words, intuiting moral
propositions, or mind-independent moral facts, is not sufficient for establishing their
indefeasible truth.
I have already elucidated Moderate Rationalists' responses to important
objections like Mackie's, which suppose that intuition is a "special faculty." BonJour,
for example, points out that the only faculties humans need to recognize via intuition
(or self-evidence) are the abilities to understand and to think; likewise, Audi makes
similar claims about maintaining the viability of an intuitive faculty. 87
Robert Audi
Robert Audi in "Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics"
distinguishes strong and weak versions of intuitionism. The strong version of
intuitionism holds that "the intuitive faculty yields indefeasible knowledge of selfevident moral truths." 88 A relatively weaker epistemological conception is, however,
more plausible and more commonly held by those who advocate intuitionism. This
is, "roughly the thesis that basic moral judgments and basic moral principles are
justified by the non-inferential deliverances of a rational, intuitive faculty, a mental
capacity that contrasts with sense perception, clairvoyance, and other possible routes
to justification." 89
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BonJour, 107-9. Audi argues a similar thesis, but in much less concise statement in The Good in the
Right (see pgs. 32 and 78).
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Audi's weak intuition has four primary characteristics. (1) Intuitions are noninferential (directness requirement) since one's belief of an intuited proposition is not
on the basis of premise(s). (2) An intuition must be a moderately firm cognition
(firmness requirement). "A mere inclination to believe is not an intuition; an intuition
tends to be a 'conviction' (a term Ross sometimes used for an intuition) and to be
relinquished only through such weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly
held theory or with another intuition." 90 (3) Intuitions are formed merely on the basis
of understanding the contents of the intuited proposition (comprehension
requirement). And, (4) (the pretheoretical requirement), "[Intuitions] are neither
evidentially dependent on theories nor themselves theoretical hypotheses.” 91 These
represent the directness, firmness, comprehension and pretheoretical requirements,
respectively; and are descriptive of the cognitive sense of intuition: a psychological
state asserting some belief. Audi distinguishes it from the propositional sense that
concerns the content of propositions: by virtue of a proposition's content it is selfevident.
In The Good and the Right, Audi elucidates Ross's Intuitionism to make more
apparent how it is different from other forms of intuitionism and he articulates a
Rossian type of intuitionism that emphasizes intuition can be both self-evident and
defeasible. He makes the special point to remove Ross from Moore's shadow.
Moore's epistemological project to establish that some moral beliefs can be
indefeasible and foundational is, as I have shown, problematic.
90

Ibid., 110.
Ibid. The pretheoreticality requirement constitutes, as Audi points out, a negative dependence not a
positive dependence. Theoretical elements can act as defeaters of intuitions, but intuitions cannot be
dependent on theories.
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In general, Audi takes self-evidence to entail that the truth of a proposition is
contained 'in itself'. That is, "a proposition is self-evident provided an adequate
understanding of it is sufficient both for being justified in believing it and for
knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding." 92 Audi distinguishes
between first-order intuitions, understanding that a proposition is true (noninferentially); and second-order intuitions, understanding that a proposition is selfevident and as such is non-inferential and is true in itself. Thus, justifying intuitions
can be twofold. There is a first-order justification that is direct, immediate, and noninferential: apprehending qua intuition. And, a second-order justification that is
inferred: Audi's reply to The Meta-justification Problem. It justifies our first-order
intuition. It is on this second-order that justification of the first-order is given by
apprehending that the proposition has the properties of being direct, immediate, and
non-inferential. Audi argues that the first-order belief is all that is needed to save
intuition form the sort of objections that challenge its foundationalism.
I have already shown that Audi differentiates two sorts of self-evidence:
immediate self-evidence vs. mediated self-evidence. He also distinguishes, albeit
problematically, conclusions of inference from conclusions of reflection. Audi's
supposition is that conclusions of reflection are based on reasoning that is "nonlinear" and "global" but does not contain premises or constitute 'inferentiality' in the
process of arriving at the self-evident. Bart Streumer points out in his review of The
Good and the Right that Audi's reasoning for the distinction between inferential and
non-inferential justification is not at all clear. Streumer writes,
92
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He comes closest to explaining this when he distinguishes what he calls 'conclusions of
inference' from 'conclusions of reflection'. He claims that conclusions of inference are
"premised on propositions noted as evidence" (p. 45), and that reasoning that results in such
conclusions is "premise-based" (p. 198). And he writes that conclusions of reflection "emerge
from thinking about [something] as a whole, but not from one or more evidential premises,"
that drawing such a conclusion is "a kind of wrapping up of the question, akin to concluding a
practical matter with a decision," that when one has drawn such a conclusion "one has
obtained a view of the whole and thereby broadly characterized it" (pp. 45-6), and that
reasoning that leads to such conclusions is "non-linear and in a certain way global" (p. 198). 93

The upshot of Streumer's objection is that there is no clear line between what
is a premise and what is not. Moreover, why is it that we should not consider "the
view of the whole" a premise by which base the self-evidence of a proposition? If the
line between what is a premise and what is not a premise is blurry, then so is the line
between what is inferentially derived and what is non-inferentially derived. We shall
see that evidence from cognitive science will shed some light on the cognitive
processes that occur when one reasons or reflects as a means to intuiting some
propositions.
Laurence BonJour
Laurence BonJour is a Rationalist. In In Defense of Pure Reason, he attempts
"to arrive at an understanding of the nature, rationale, and limits of the a priori
variety of epistemic justification." 94 BonJour writes,
I propose to count a proposition P as being justified a priori (for a particular person, at a
particular time) if and only if that person has a reason for thinking P to be true that does not
depend on any positive appeal to experience or other causally mediated, quasi-perceptual
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Bart Streumer, review of The Good and the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value by
Robert Audi, Notre Dame Philosophical Review (July 3,2004), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=3041
(accessed March 22, 2007).
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contact with contingent features of the world, but only on pure thought or reason, even if the
person's ability to understand P in question derives, in whole or in part from experience. 95

BonJour's project closely parallels Audi's attempt to establish the viability of a
moral intuitionism. A priori justification amounts to something like an intuitive
process of apprehending that a proposition is true, self-evidently. 96 BonJour writes,
given this understanding of the ingredients of the proposition, I am able to see or grasp or
apprehend in a seemingly direct and unmediated way that the claim in question cannot fail to
be true - that the nature of redness and greenness are such as to preclude their being jointly
realized. It is this direct insight into the necessity of the claim in question that seems, at least
prima facie, to justify my accepting it as true. 97

Apparent intuition (and apparent self-evidence) thus provide the basis for a
priori epistemic justification that is not infallible.98 It is possible that some intuitions
are not genuine or that some intuited propositions are not understood in a way that
reveals that they are intuitive or self-evident.
Problematic for Audi and BonJour is the role of experience in intuitive
knowledge and a priori justification. 99 Audi and BonJour must reconcile direct, noninferential insight with the apparently required component of understanding
propositions. Both need to exclude from the intuitive apprehension of propositions
that believing those propositions is inferentially based in knowledge from one's
95

Ibid., 11.
“a priori justification occurs when the mind directly or intuitively sees or grasps or apprehends (or
perhaps merely seems to itself to see or grasp or apprehend) a necessary fact about the nature or
structure of reality” (Ibid., 15-16)
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experiences. If, in the process of intuitively apprehending some proposition, one
infers the truth of that proposition from other beliefs or knowledge gained from
experience, then the knowledge derived is not intuitive knowledge. For example, we
cannot know what the color red is without having an experience of 'red'. Thus, for
such self-evident propositions like 'Nothing can be both red and green all over and at
the same time,' truth is inferred from experience since we could not have a concept of
red a priori (if not 'truth' directly, then the meaning of the color red has to be
inferred). 100
BonJour argues that experiences imprint themselves on the mind. That is, we
form beliefs of them. Thus, they can be considered, once they have lost their
empirical justification - i.e. our experiencing them, a priori in character We can
apprehend their content without the empirical ground that formerly served as their
justification. "Experiences" are no longer only knowable by experience qua
experience. Divorced of their empirical ground, they are now merely aspects of
cognition - a priori in character. BonJour follows in the tradition of Kant specifying,
"a proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no [positive] appeal to
experience is needed for the proposition to be justified once it is understood, where it
is allowed that experience may have been needed to achieve such an
understanding." 101
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BonJour is particularly plagued with excluding a posteriori knowledge from intuitive a priori
justification. Propositions entailing that one must have had some particular experience to understand
what is contained within the proposition seem to lose their a priori character. They are contingent
upon the agent having some particular a posteriori knowledge or empirically grounded beliefs.
101
Ibid., 10.
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To some extent, I think BonJour is correct. However, much more can be said
about 'understanding' and 'thinking' in regard to human intuitions and memory. It is
here that cognitive science becomes very relevant to discussions about the function
and operation of intuition.
Summary of the Problems for the Moderate Intuitionists
The Moderate Intuitionists attempt to offer conceptions of intuition that are
not susceptible to the critiques of Classic Intuitionism, especially those of Moorian
Intuitionism. However, Audi and BonJour have yet to offer a satisfactory account of
what goes on when one 'understands' the self-evidence of a proposition. Related is
Audi's attempt to broaden to scope of 'non-inferentiality' in order to substantiate the
plausibility of a mediated self-evidence. 102 He is unclear how we ought to distinguish
what is inferential from what is non-inferential.103
Empirical examination of the underlying cognitive processes of an intuitive
faculty have the potential to illuminate whether intuitions are in fact 'non-discursive'
or if we just experience them as being so. Relevant to the 'non-discursive' problem
will be whether intuitive knowledge is indeed immediate and non-inferential.
Also, I argue in the following that an empirically informed conception of
intuition does not fail in the light of the External Criteria Problem, which argues that
empirical justification of intuited beliefs undermines the a priori character of
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Likewise, BonJour has broadened the concept of a priori knowledge.
For a relatively short but interesting discussion of these problems in Audi’s work, see Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, “Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture of Reason,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXVII (1) (July 2003).
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intuition, since the objection presupposes the a priori character of intuitions.
Evidence will show intuition should be alternatively conceived. 104

104

Problematic for moral realism in general is the Causal Objection. An account of how mindindependent moral facts relate to one’s cognitions of them is needed to account for the relation
between them. But, this answer will have to be left for elsewhere.
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Chapter 4
Cognitive Science's Study of Intuition
The scientific study of human cognition can shed light on processes of the
human mind. The relationship between studies in cognitive science and the
philosophical picture of intuition is neither straightforward nor obvious. Cognitive
science is still studying how the mind works, including drawing its conclusions about
intuition. This should not, however, deter us from our attempts to draw together
philosophy and cognitive science. We can still say something substantive.
Philosophers do not do not use 'intuition' consistently. Thus, it is not
surprising to find difficultly in discerning a consistency between what philosophers
call intuition and what cognitive scientists call 'intuition'. This is problematic not only
because of the ambiguous use of 'intuition' in philosophy, but also because cognitive
sciences uses 'intuition' to refer to a cognitive capacity that it has yet to define fully.
Philosophers and cognitive scientists are both pointing at something similar; both
ostensively define what they are attempting to discern. The following are a few
samples of cognitive science's characterization of 'intuition':
[A] preliminary perception of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure) that is at first not
consciously represented, but which nevertheless, guides thought and inquiry toward a hunch
or hypothesis about the nature of coherence in question. 105

[T]he phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen
flash of illumination. 106
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K. S. Bowers, G. Regehr, C. Balthazard and K. Parker, “Intuition in the context of discovery,”
Cognitive Psychology 22 (1990), 74; 72–110.
106
Janet Metcalfe and David Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving,” Memory &
Cognition 15, no. 3 (1987), 238; 238 – 246.
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[P]erception of possibilities, meaning and relationships by way of insight … [and] the
unconscious. Intuitions may come to the surface of consciousness suddenly, as a 'hunch', the
sudden perception of a pattern in seemingly unrelated events, or as creative discovery. 107

[I]f participants' metacognitions showed a sudden solution, then we should call those
problems insight problems, and if they do not then we should not. 108

These feelings are best thought of as affect-laden intuitions, as they appear suddenly and
effortlessly in consciousness, with an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feeling
of having gone through any steps of searching, weighing evidence or inferring a
conclusion. 109

A later and more focused examination of moral intuition is articulated by
Jonathan Haidt in "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment." 110 For Haidt, moral intuition is
the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence
(good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of
searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. 111

It seems that cognitive science and philosophy start at the same
phenomenological description of having intuitions: what Audi calls intuition in its
'cognitive sense' as opposed to the 'propositional sense'. The former pertains to
occurrent or dispositional states of mind and the latter to the content of the
propositions. Even philosophers like Moore and BonJour who emphasize the
propositional sense of intuition begin their examination by recognizing intuition via
107

I.B. Myers and M.H. McCaulley, Manual: A Guide to the development and use of the MBTI.
(Consulting Psychologists Press, 1986), 12.
108
Janet Metcalfe, “Insight and Metacognition,” in Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology:
Monitoring and Control Processes, ed. Mazzoni and Nelson (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers, 1998): 194; 181-197.
109
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?” in Trends in
Cognitive Science 6 (2002), 517; 517-523.
110
Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment,” Psychological Review, Vol. 108, No. 4 (2001), 814-34.
111
Ibid., 818.
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its cognitive or phenomenological properties. I submit that cognitive science has
done the same.
For cognitive science, intuition serves as one side to a dichotomy concerning
how judgments occur: in general, it serves to denote fast, unconscious, and
unintentional reasoning processes. The contrasted alternative is a stepwise, conscious
reasoning process. Haidt contrasts direct and stepwise systems of judgment in the
table below (Table 1). 112
Haidt's overall project is to forward what he calls a Social Intuitionist Model
of Moral Reasoning. The social intuitionist model emphasizes that moral judgments
are the result of affect-laden intuitions, contra models that hold moral judgments are
largely the upshot of internal reflection and explicit, conscious reasoning. Haidt's
findings concern how moral judgments are made, not normative claims as to how
moral judgments should be made. 113 Haidt argues that intuitions are affected by
social and cultural influences.
Cognitive science, however, does not seem to acknowledge the epistemic
components of intuitive knowledge. We can, at least, acknowledge that cognitive
science is empirically testing the same sort of intuitive capacities that are the concern
of Moore, Ross, Prichard, BonJour, and Audi; even if they are not explicitly
examining the epistemic character of intuitive knowledge. Inferences from findings
112

Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate
cultural variable virtues,” Daedalus 133 (4) (Fall 2004), 56.
113
Haidt, with Craig Joseph, argues that “human beings come with an intuitive ethics, an innate
preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving
other human beings […] These intuitions under-gird the moral systems that cultures develop, including
their understanding of virtues and character. By recognizing that cultures build incommensurable
moralities on top of a foundation of shared intuitions, we can develop new approaches to moral
education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society” (Ibid.)
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Table 1: General Features of Intuitive and Reasoning Systems

in cognitive science to their bearing on the characteristics of intuitive knowledge will
be drawn here. The strength of those inferences is debatable.
It worth noting that Haidt's conception of intuition is closer to the
philosophical conceptions of intuition that I have elucidated above than the other
accounts. That Haidt's notion of intuition is more recently articulated and should be
taken seriously since his findings build upon previous empirical research and
findings.
My aim in the following section is to lay out relevant empirical studies of
intuitive capacities and relate them to the arguments concerning intuition in
philosophy: especially to investigate how they weigh in on objections to intuition.
The upshot of these observations will show a parallel between the epistemological
conception of intuition of the Moderate Intuitionists and the empirical studies of
intuitive capacities. However, one point of will come under heavy contention, i.e.,
whether intuition are truly non-inferential. The empirical evidence shows that
intuitions are the upshot of non-conscious or unconscious inferences.
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Experimental Evidence Concerning Intuition
Surprisingly, epistemologically oriented philosophers have taken little note of
the work that has been done in cognitive science. It seems obvious that intuition is a
normal aspect of human cognition: intuitions are a common aspect of human
experience and most people claim that they have intuitions.
Empirical study of cognitions illuminates how conscious and unconscious
processes manifest themselves as an intuition. Surprisingly, a relatively consistent
picture of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies. Cognitive science
will be able to tell us something about the immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is
indeed non-inferential, and whether intuition can apprehend the self-evidence of
propositions.
Cognitive science can also weigh in on the objections that Moderate
Intuitionism attempts to deal with. In particular, intuitions do seem fallible and
defeasible. A vivid picture of how intuition works could offer a solution to The
Meta-justification Problem. Also, if intuitions are painted as stepwise processes and
subject to examination, then we can determine criteria that help produce reliable
intuitions. However, if we are to accept criteria for intuitions, then we must first
overcome The External Criteria Problem - we must show that empirically defined
criteria for the proper functioning of an intuitive faculty do not undermine selfevident propositions' a priori assertability.
Are Intuitions Defeasible and/or Fallible?
Defeasible beliefs are those that can be overridden or undermined by reasons:
either by reasons which force us to doubt the way by which the belief was formed or
57

by reasons which are a 'better fit', are more consistent, or have better coherence with
other relevant beliefs. Fallible beliefs are a result of belief-forming processes that can
make incorrect beliefs. 114
In "Intuition in Insight and Non-Insight Problem Solving," Janet Metcalfe and
David Wiebe tested intuition's accuracy. 115 They found that subjective feelings of
knowing predicted performance on algebra problems (noninsight problems) but not
on insight problems. 116 In addition, they find that subjects' expectations of
performance greatly overestimate their actual performance, exceedingly so on insight
problems. 117
Metcalfe and Wiebe's study offers empirical evidence that intuited knowledge
is fallible. It supports the same sort of fallibility that Audi and BonJour argue for in
connection with Moderate Intuitionism.
These findings weigh in on the 'Non-discursive' and the Dogmatic Objections.
If intuitions are indeed the product of unconscious inferences, then they may have a
stepwise functioning that could be evaluated for adequacy. Emotional or dogmatic
biases could be identified by these evaluations.
Immediacy and Other Issues Relating to Intuitive Knowledge
Bowers et al. disagree with Janet Metcalfe over the temporal immediacy (the
phenomenological sense of immediacy) of intuitions. Metcalfe argues that
experimental data suggests intuitions are gestalt in that they occur suddenly and
114

I use ‘incorrect’ in an attempt to remain neutral in regard to what make a ‘true’ belief.
Metcalfe and Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving,” 238 – 246.
116
Criteria for insight problems, as Metcalfe and Wiebe note, were “note well defined” (240). Most
were labeled as such in previous literature.
117
“Normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own
predictions” (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 238).
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without steps or increment. Kenneth S. Bowers, Glenn Regehr, and Claude
Balthazard examine intuition in the context of discovery: intuition as informed
judgment. They argue that data suggest intuition is a response to unconscious
inferences in mnemonic and semantic neural networks that only manifest consciously
as gestalt-like belief formations. 118 I elucidate Metcalfe's views and what Bowers et
al. argue in the way of intuition. I suggest that Bowers et al. do not characterize
Metcalfe's position accurately and Metcalfe and Bowers et al. have similar
conceptions of intuition.
Janet Metcalfe
Metcalfe has published a number of studies on intuition, or insight (as it is
sometimes called). 119 She has collected her more recent experimental data regarding
intuition; presenting it in "Insight and Metacognition." 120 There she argues, "many
common physical and biological processes have the quality of spontaneous change the construct itself is scientifically reputable, and the validity of the construct of
spontaneous psychological processes in problem solving cannot be ruled out on a

118

Connectionism is a cognitive science approach to explain the functioning of the mind in term of
neural networks. Mnemonic and semantic neural networks are connectionist systems. These systems
have seven basic components:
(1) a set of processing units (nodes), (2) a state of activation defined over the units, (3) an
output function for each unit that maps it activation state onto an output, (4) a pattern of
connectivity (with various “weights”) among units, (5) an activation rule for combining the
inputs to a unit with its present state to produce a new activation level, (6) a learning rule that
uses experience to modify the pattern of connectivity among the units, and (7) an environment
in which the system functions. (Casebeer, 83)
119
Janet Metcalfe and David Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving” Memory &
Cognition 15(3) (1987): 238 – 246. Janet Metcalfe, ”Feeling of knowing and memory in problem
solving,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 12(2) (1986): 288294; ”Premonitions of Insight Predict Impending Error,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 12(4) (1986): 623-634; [And] ”Insight and Metacognition,” in
Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology: Monitoring and Control Processes, ed. Mazzoni and
Nelson. (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998): 181-197.
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Metcalfe, ”Insight and Metacognition,” 181-197.

59

priori grounds." 121 She argues that this as an empirical question that can be
uncovered by scientific investigations. Metcalfe's investigations suggest that
intuition, as a feeling of rightness or belief that one is correct, occurs as a "nearspontaneous change in representations in insight problem solving that contrasts to the
incremental changes that underlie routine problem solving." 122 To show that insights
are the upshot of a gestalt process, Metcalfe reviews three areas of cognitive data:
'feeling-of-knowing' data about person's predictions on problem solving and memory
retrieval tasks; amnesic patients with severe memory dysfunction - presumably if
there is severe damage to areas of the brain responsible for memory, persons with
such damage would not have normal insight capacities, but only if insight is the
upshot of a memory retrieval process; and, Metcalfe argues that if insight is the
product of memory retrieval only, then we have to account for "Menon's Paradox." 123
Metcalfe attempts to show that insights, or intuitions, occur in rapid phase
changes. She argues that in the same way that there is not a stable structure of H20
among solid, liquid, or gas phases, there are not 'stable' steps that are inclusive of the
intuitive process. That is, there is a parallel between the rapid phase shifts that occur
in other natural processes and those that manifest as intuitions. Both seem to have
intermediary steps that are not incremental: there are no coherent intermediary steps
that lead to a conclusion.
121

Ibid., 181. Metcalfe offers the phase changes of water molecules as evidence for things in nature
having the capacity to undergo rapid, gestalt-like changes.
122
Ibid., 188.
123
Metcalfe argues that “memory-only theorists,” those that think that problem solving is
accomplished by remembering the solution, cannot account for the regress problem – how the problem
was solved the first time. Such a view precludes that novel solutions can occur. However, Metcalfe
points out that “it seems reasonable to postulate that there exists some process by which events,
structures or solutions that are new emerge” (Ibid., 194-5).
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To evidence that these sorts of gestalt changes occur in cognition, we can look
to examples like the Necker Cube or the duck-rabbit pictures. Our understanding of
the contents of these sorts of images changes rapidly, almost immediately when we
understand that the lines that make up the images can represent more than one form.
However, if one who sees the duck-rabbit has only ever seen a duck and never a
rabbit, or vice versa, then they will not 'see' the other image. Thus, it seems that some
sort of memory is involved in gestalt perceptual changes, even though they lack
intermediary forms of apprehension.
Metcalfe cites previous data collected from her insight experiments. 124 These
experiments examined the role of memory in insight problem solving. The data
collected, Metcalfe argues, supports an argument that if insight involved memory
retrieval that memory retrieval problems and insight tasks would have roughly the
same pattern of results.
Participants were given problems that they would not know the immediate
answers to, insight problems; were also given algebra; and noninsight problems.
Noninsight problems were multistep problems that had been designated in previous
literature. 125 Subjects were asked to indicate their feelings-of-warmth, or how close
they felt they were to the actual solution to the problem, at 5 to 10-second intervals.
Ratings were marked on a graduated scale labeled 'cold' to 'hot.' Metcalfe assumes
that if the participant indicated having greater feelings of warmth as they progress
124

Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) and Metcalfe (1986)
An example non-insight problem: “Given containers of 163, 14, 25, and 11 ounces, and a source of
unlimited water, obtain exactly 77 ounces of water” (Luchins, 1942). An example insight problem: “A
prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope which was half long
enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the rope in half and tied the two parts
together and escaped. How could he have done this?” (Restle & Davis, 1962).
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towards solution, then it would show that the participant was proceeding, stepwise
towards a solution - a noninsight solution. Insight solutions, however, would not
have gradated reports of warmth ratings. In a second experiment, participants were
asked to make predictions about their ability to answer on two sorts of problems, of
which they would not know the answer to immediately: memory recall problems and
solution problems.
Metcalfe (and Wiebe) found that,
(1) subjective feelings of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on
insight problems;
(2) subjects' expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance,
especially on insight problems;
(3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did
subjects' own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and
(4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects' feeling of approaching solution,
differed for insight and noninsight problems. 126

Metcalfe explains two possibilities for the evidence she collected. There is a
process underlying insight that (1) "may undergo a sudden shift - reflected in the
metacognitive judgments," or (2) the process occurs in steps and is incremental,
however, it is not consciously able to be inspected. 127 The distinction among these
processes at first seems moot in regard to whether insights, or intuitions, are
inferential. But, perhaps not, if we remember the Moderate Intuitionist's attempts to
broaden the notion of 'non-inferentiality'. If the underlying process turns out to be
gestalt-like change - metacognitive judgment without coherent intermediary steps then the Moderate Intuitionist has more ground to support the claim that intuitions are
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Metcalfe and Wiebe, 238.
Metcalfe, ”Insight and Metacognition,” 191.
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non-inferential even on 'global consideration', e.g. Audi's soft self-evidence.
However, if intuition turns out to be the upshot of unconscious stepwise judgment
procedures, then a stronger argument that unconscious steps to a judgment do not
constitute inferential belief formation is needed. Unfortunately, in 1998, Metcalfe
cannot tell us which is correct. Bowers et al., however, contest Metcalfe's findings. 128
Their criticisms are, to an extent, misplaced.
Bowers et al. argue that Metcalfe's "gestalt view implies that the experience of
sudden insight reflects a genuine discontinuity in the underlying perceptual cognitive processing of information - a more or less spontaneous restructuring of the
problem that immediately yields a solution." 129 However, neither of the reasons that
Metcalfe offers for her findings entail "discontinuity." Her analogy to similar gestalt
events in nature is relevant here. There is no discontinuity in water when it changes
among liquid, gas, and solid states. At all times, we can track its structural form and
see that the same molecules arrange themselves into different structures. Metcalfe
even begins "Insight and Metacognition" by divorcing herself from these, as she puts
it, "messenger of God views." 130 Bowers et al., however, offer more substantive
criticisms of Metcalfe's experimental assumptions.
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We should note, however, Bowers et al. assume intuition as part of a judgment process. “Most
recent work concerned with intuition has emphasized the errors of intuitive judgment as informed
judgment in the context of discovery. The present research instead views intuition as informed
judgment in the context of discovery.” Kenneth S. Bowers, et. al., “Intuition in the Context of
Discovery,” Cognitive Psychology 22, 72-110 (1990), 72.
129
Ibid., 95.
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Metcalfe, 1998, 182. She cites Weisberg’s Creativity, Genius, and Other Myths:
The messenger of God view assumes that creative products come about through leaps. The
creative person suddenly begins to produce something complete without knowing where it is
coming from. This view has com down to us least from the Greeks, who believed that the
gods or the Muses breathed creative ideas into the artist […] . Studies of famous scientists
and artists often emphasize their spontaneous “aha!” aspect of creativity[…] . If creative
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Bowers et al. challenge Metcalfe's assumption that if solution warmth ratings
are gradated, then the solution procedure is stepwise. They point out that, "it may
well be that warmth ratings do not always reflect the underlying cognitive
convergence toward a solution, much as memories can surface without an
anticipatory or accompanying experience of remembering (Bowers & Hilgard, 1988;
Ecich, 1984; Graf & Schacter, 1987; Schacter, 1987)." 131 Thus, warmth ratings are
poor for distinguishing insight from noninsight metacognitions.
Bowers et al.
Bowers et al. set out to answer, "How does a person proceed from the
perception of three clue-words to the solution of a coherent triad?" 132 They argue that
the evidence they collected suggests that the apprehension of clue-words
automatically activates other related words in the semantic and mnemonic neural
networks. Thus the phenomenon we experience as intuition is 'presupposed' by the
underlining cognitive processing of neural networks. This view offers a more
concrete view of what Audi and BonJour merely call 'thinking' and 'understanding'.
Semantic and mnemonic networks overlap to some degree. The former is of
conceptually related semantic terms; the latter is a set of information that has been
coded in a particular way for easy recall. One may create a mnemonic by associating
conceptual ideas for a usual route they might take. One might make a mnemonic
achievements do indeed come about through great leaps of insight, brought about by
extraordinary thought processes, in individuals who possess some unanalyzable quality called
genius, then little more can be said. Creative thinking must remain mysterious and
unknowable. … The creative capacity that the ancient Greeks assigned to the mythical gods
has in our era been assigned to the unconscious and other exotic processes. (Weisberg, 1986,
pp. 1-3)
131
Bowers et al., 96.
132
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using the route they take to class, associating buildings and landmarks with important
concepts/words/ideas they need for an exam. For example, one might relate Socrates
to the 'Stadium', Plato to 'Parking', and Aristotle to 'Annex' to remember the historical
order to the Greek philosophers since as one walks to class one first passes the
Stadium, then Parking, and finally arrives at the Annex. Alternatively, one might use
the word 'spa' as a mnemonic device: Socrates, Plato and then Aristotle. We have
much less influence over the way that semantic networks are coded. Consider the
example diagram of semantic memory relations that Collins and Quillian offer
(Figure 1). 133

Figure 1: Collins and Quillian Semantic Network

133

Figure is from A.M. Collins and M.R. Quillian, “Retrival Time from Semantic Memory,” Journal
of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 8 (2) (1969), 240-7.

65

When clue-words are related to the same word in the semantic network and
that word is multiply activated by its associated clue-words, then "this common
associate is more likely to be cognitively represented than competing associates
which are not multiply activated (Collins & Loftus, 1975)." 134 Intuitions, conceived
thusly, are responses to patterns of coherence that are already part of the mind's
structure. Interestingly, mnemonic networks are not 'hard wired' into the brain. Their
contents are dependent upon individuals' experiences and learning. That is, if one
does not know what a dog is, then 'dog' will not be part of a semantic network.
Bowers et al. found "that people could respond discriminately to coherence
they could not identify, and […] that this tacit perception of coherence guided people
gradually to an explicit representation of it in the form of a hunch or hypothesis." 135
Intuition occurs in two stages: the guiding stage and the integrative stage. First, "By
a process of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), clues that reflect (and
ultimately reveal) coherence automatically activate relevant mnemonic networks thereby producing a tacit or implicit perception of coherence. […] the clues to
coherence activate relevant mnemonic networks in a graded and cumulative
fashion." 136 There is a transition into the second, integrative stage that is experienced
as a "sudden, gestalt-like perception or insight that seems virtually self-validating." 137
Once sufficient neural activation has been reached, the threshold between conscious
and unconscious awareness is crossed and the agent integrates the formerly
unconscious apprehensions of coherence into conscious representations. The second
134
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stage justifies the guiding stage by contextualizing the unconscious apprehension of
coherence.
There are related set of studies that support the findings of Bowers et al. on
unconscious affects on belief formation by John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand.
In "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being," they show that the function of
unconscious cognitive processes supplements much of our conscious experience of
thought. 138 Hence, their findings suggest that our awareness of our thoughts does not
tell us the whole story of how our thoughts come to be. Our conscious thoughts can
have unconscious origins. If unconscious processing is occurring before agents are
consciously aware of intuitions or the phenomena of experiencing an intuitive faculty,
then phenomenological immediacy, epistemological immediacy, and that intuitive
knowledge is arrived at non-inferentially and still be self-evident needs to be reexamined.
We now have a way of formulating 'thinking' and 'understanding' in regard to
apprehending self-evident proposition. We have a theoretical structure that explains
why intuitions seem to occur immediately and have the feeling of being direct though
they are the upshot of stored 'memory' in neural networks. However, it is
questionable whether we should consider the operation of semantic and mnemonic
neural networks to undermine the non-inferential character of intuited knowledge.
The question still spins on what counts as a premise. I'll leave this question for
elsewhere.
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John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,” American
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Chapter 5
Unification of the Moderate Intuitionist Position and Cognitive Science
Cognitive science presents philosophers with a more complete account of
'understanding' in relation to the faculty of intuition. This Connectionist conception
of 'understanding' holds that entailed in the intuitive process is the operation of
mnemonic and semantic neural networks, whose operation is almost entirely
unavailable to conscious introspection. Bowers et al. offer a Connectionist
explanation of the processes that grasp a proposition's meaning, pointing out that
apprehensions, conscious and unconscious, correlate with activation energies of
mnemonic and semantic neural networks. Data from cognitive science suggest that
this process is largely unconscious. Intuitions are manifestations of memories/beliefs
stored and sorted in mnemonic and semantic neural networks. 139 If 'understanding'
propositions is the upshot of the operation of these neural networks, then the intuitive
knowledge that is the result of an intuitive faculty needs to be re-examined.
'Understanding' takes plays a different justificatory role when it is the upshot of
discernable cognitive processing. In the following, I point out the implications the
results from cognitive science have for the characteristics of intuitive knowledge.
Self-evidence
Given that mnemonic and semantic neural networks seem to be component in
understanding self-evident propositions, what should we make of Audi's conception
of self-evidence? Audi, construes "the basic kind of self-evident proposition as
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Admittedly, it is unclear to me as to how we ought to define the ‘data’ that are contained in neural
networks.
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(roughly) a truth such that any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (1)
in virtue of having that understanding, one is justified in believing the proposition
(i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact believes it or not); and (2) if
one believes the proposition on the basis of that understanding of it, then one knows
it." 140 Ingredient in the conditions of self-evidence is "understanding." 141 The
grounds for 'understanding', however, are, on the Connectionist model, much more
complex than Audi would have them be. 'Understanding', thusly conceived, is a
distinguishable cognitive process, the contents and operation of which can be
mapped. The Connectionist model of semantic and mnemonic neural networks,
which serves as this map, leads us to question whether the 'understanding' that is
entailed by self-evidence does not preclude 'non-inferentiality' or immediacy.
'Non-inferentiality'
Connectionism seems obviously to report that there are inferences, as
connections between nodes, made when one's intuitive faculty is operating.
However, that Connectionist systems, semantic and mnemonic neural networks, are
part of the process of intuition, does not entail that Connectionism requires inferences
- 'connections' in neural networks may not be inferences. Related is Audi's attempt to
broaden the scope of 'non-inferentiality' in order to substantiate the plausibility of a
mediated self-evidence. 142 To my mind, the issue of whether mnemonic and
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Audi, “Self-evidence,” 206.
Note that ‘understanding’ is also entailed by the comprehension requirement for Audi’s weak
intuitionism.
142
Likewise, BonJour has broadened the concept of a priori knowledge. Audi is unclear how we
ought to distinguish what is inferential from what is non-inferential.
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semantic neural processing makes intuited beliefs the product of inference turns on
what we might consider a premise and what we might consider an inference.
Premises are, generally, those things that serve as a basis for a conclusion.
We might say that premises 'lead us to the conclusion'. However, we can usually be
forthcoming with the premises we use for a particular conclusion. A rather parochial
example might be 'torture inflicts pain on people' and 'inflicting pain on people is
wrong' are premises for the conclusion that 'It is wrong to torture people'. We,
however, cannot be forthcoming with the unconscious operations of neural networks,
yet they still in some sense lead us to a conclusion. But, as Audi argues in The
Structure of Justification, beliefs may be "episodically inferential." 143 For example,
"An inferential belief [not equivalent to a belief based on inference] may be based on
another belief with such argumental mediation; on the basis of believing that the trees
are swaying, I may believe that the wind is blowing, without mentally passing from
the former as premise to the latter as conclusion." 144 However, I think we might
burden Audi with having to say 'without consciously passing from the former as a
premise to the latter as a conclusion'. Thus, an unconscious premise may be
inferentially involved in intuitive apprehension.
An uncontroversial concept of a premise includes the condition that it is a
'proposition' - i.e. something that we can attribute truth-value to. Thusly, the
proposition that we experience as the upshot of intuition is the product of inference
only if it comes to be represented in consciousness on the grounds of some other

143
144

Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20.
Ibid.
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proposition entailed in the unconscious processing of mnemonic and semantic neural
networks. To use the example above, we might experience the apprehension of 'It is
wrong to torture people.' as self-evident and the upshot of an intuitive faculty.
However, unconscious processing may entail the propositions 'torture inflicts pain on
people' and 'inflicting pain on people is wrong', without which we would not
apprehend the truth of 'It is wrong to torture people.' That propositions are contained
in the mnemonic and semantic neural networks does not mean that they are
inferentially connected in a relevant way to the intuitively formed belief. A more
detailed account of the contents and relations of contents of neural processing needs
to be made in regard to unconscious belief forming processes. There are, however,
new grounds to base questions about the non-inferential characteristic of intuitive
knowledge.
Immediacy
Intuitions are phenomenologically immediate, but not epistemologically direct
- at least, not in the sense that they directly apprehend mind-independent moral facts.
Immediacy in the phenomenological sense is related to the issues concerning
mediately self-evident propositions. Bowers et al. do not seem to rule out that the
upshot of intuitive processing is immediate. Once neural networks reach sufficient
activation energies, they 'pop' into consciousness, in an immediate sort of way.
Immediacy in the epistemological sense that mind-independent moral facts are
directly grasped by the intuitive faculty seems to be out of the picture for intuitive
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processing since this has more to do with what moral facts are than how we think
about them. I defer this issue for other discussions. 145
Conclusion
I did not accomplish what I set out to do when I began this working on this
project: I did not come up with a coherent conception of intuition that would be
philosophically rigorous and consistent with what we know of intuition via cognitive
science. That end turned out to need a much larger project - one that seems to include
a concept or account of moral facts. I do, however, point to the direction in which
inquiry to substantiate a naturalized conception of an intuitive faculty should go, by
arguing for a Connectionist approach to explaining how it is that we cogitate about
moral matters. The Connectionist approach, arguably, can shed light on the way we
make moral judgments and it deserves further analysis and study.
Some questions yet remain: (1) Are premises entailed by the functioning of
mnemonic and semantic networks when their upshot is belief formation? That is,
should we count 'global considerations' as premises? (2) By what means might we
evaluate the discursive character of mnemonic and semantic networks? (3) Can we
correlate certain sets of experience with particular self-evidences? That is, do certain

145

Note: Moderate Intuitionists attempt to circumvent the problems of foundationism for intuitionism.
A problem for the Classic Intuitionists (moral realists) is how to maintain foundational justification in
the light of the fact that intuitive knowledge is sometimes overridden or that one might merely change
their mind about the self-evidence of a proposition. One can argue that intuitionists cannot invoke the
sort justification that makes moral facts, or beliefs of moral facts, foundational in a structure of
justification if they are inferred from other beliefs.
Foundational justification for intuition seems undermined when intuitions are the upshot of the
unconscious processing of the human mind. If intuition is to give foundational moral knowledge,
moral beliefs of the sort that we can found other moral beliefs on, then it needs to be shown how selfevident moral propositions are epistemologically direct. To my mind, the answer to this question
requires a conception of mind-independent moral facts.
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experiences predispose agents to apprehending a set of self-evident propositions,
while another set of experience will predispose agents to apprehending different set of
self-evident propositions?
Admittedly, more work needs to be done in this area. However, studies in
cognitive science illuminate some aspects of intuition that have been previously
unavailable to philosophers.
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